STATE PRISONERS AND THE EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES: SECTION 1983
JURISDICTION AND THE AVAILABILITY OF
ADEQUATE STATE REMEDIES
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES:
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

Administrative agencies are those governmental bodies operating
outside the formal court and legislative structure which may serve
executive, legislative, and judicial functions. 1 The degree of control
which must be exercised over the activities of administrative agencies
is accomplished by means of judicial review of agency adjudicatory or
rulemaking activity, either through statutory appeal 2 or by independent court action initiated by an aggrieved party. 3 It has long been
established that a party will normally be denied judicial relief until
the available administrative remedies have been exhausted. 4 This
1 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 1.01, at 1 (1958) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS]. It was initially anticipated that reliance on the administrative process "would
supplant in some respect the costliness of litigation in our courts." Landis, The Adninistrative Process: The Third Decade, 47 A.B.A.J. 135, 138 (1961). Furthermore, the
administration of certain laws by the judiciary was thought to be too "time consuming."
Rothman, Time and Tide in Taft-Hartley, 45 L.R.R.M. 86, 89 (1960).
2 See Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970).
3 The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of agency action
"except to the extent that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). The Supreme Court
has noted that courts "start with the presumption that aggrieved persons may obtain
review of administrative decisions unless there is 'persuasive reason to believe' that
Congress had no such purpose." City of Chicago v. United States, 396 U.S. 162, 164
(1969) (quoting from Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)). See also
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1970); Associated Elec. Cooperative, Inc. v.
Morton, 507 F.2d 1167, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Welfare Rights Organization v.
Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies received early recognition in
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228-32 (1908). The leading case dealing with the exhaustion doctrine, however, is Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
303 U.S. 41 (1938). In that case the Court stated:
[T]he long settled rule of judicial administration [is] that no one is entitled to
judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.
Id. at 50-51 (footnote omitted). See also Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thomson, 318
U.S. 675, 686 (1943); Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724, 727 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 910 (1957).
Congress has statutorily required that, in certain important areas, state remedies
must be exhausted before resort to the federal courts will be permitted. See, e.g.,
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doctrine of exhaustion assumes that the administrative remedy is
available "more or less immediately" and that it will afford adequate
protection of the party's asserted right. 5 But, even when an immediate
and appropriate remedy is available, the exhaustion doctrine may
nevertheless be disregarded in certain circumstances. 6 The reasonableness of the exhaustion requirement in a particular situation demands an examination of its purpose in the context of the specific
administrative procedures.
Various rationales have been developed to support the imposition of the exhaustion doctrine. 7 One of the primary justifications for
requiring exhaustion is based on considerations of comityS-the wish
to avoid conflict with the states. 9 The comity doctrine, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, "is neither a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will."10 It is "a proper respect for state functions" and an acknowledgement "that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left
free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.""
A second purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to allow for
28 U.S.C. § 1342(4) (1970) (state rate orders); id. § 1341 (state taxation); id. § 2254(b)
(habeas corpus).
It is not, however, ordinarily necessary for a litigant to exhaust state judicial remedies. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939); Amsley v. West Virginia
Racing Comm'n, 378 F.2d 815, 816-18 (4th Cir. 1967); Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256,
262 (8th Cir. 1960). For a discussion of the differences between judicial and administrative remedies see Comment, Federal Judicial Power, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 1215,
1215-17 (1957).
5 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 424 (abr. student ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as JAFFE].
6 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 469 F.2d 1116,,1118 (2d Cir. i972). See, e.g., Public
Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943). For a comprehensive discussion of the various exceptions to the exhaustion requirement see Layton & Fine, The
Draft and Exhaustion ofAdministrative Remedies, 56 GEo. L.J. 315, 322-28 (1967).
7 See generally INcKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969).
8 See generally Hufstedler, Cooiity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the
Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 841 (1972); Comment, Theories of Federalism and
Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007 (1966).
9 See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 349-51 (1951);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317-18, 332-34 (1943). See also Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302
U.S. 300, 311 (1937).
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co., a pipeline company sought an interlocutory injunction
in federal court restraining the Illinois Commerce Commission from ordering it to make
available certain records for use by the commission in a pending proceeding. The Supreme Court, in affirming the denial of the injunction, stated that the requirement of
exhaustion "is of especial force when resort is had to the federal courts to restrain the
action of state officers." 302 U.S. at 310-11.
'0 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
1 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
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determination of the issues in controversy by an administrative
agency which may be uniquely qualified to determine factual questions by virtue of its expertise in a specific field.' 2 A logical extension
of the expertise rationale is that, since the administrative agency is an
autonomous body having specified powers and functions, the courts
normally ought not interfere in an administrative action. 13 The exhaustion doctrine is especially relevant "where the function of the
agency and the particular decision sought to be reviewed involve exercise of discretionary powers . . . or require application of special

expertise. "14
A further rationale for an exhaustion requirement is the efficacy
of allowing for an uninterrupted, final administrative determination of
the petitioner's claim. This requirement of finality may obviate the
need for judicial relief; the agency may make a satisfactory determination, thereby avoiding unnecessary delay and expense. 15 Additionally,
the considerations relevant to the requirement of finality as a prerequisite to the review of a lower court action by a higher court 16 are
equally applicable to the concept of administrative exhaustion.17
Paralleling many of the significant functions of a trial court, the administrative proceeding may uncover pertinent facts which will clarify
the disputed issue as well as allow for the exercise of the discretion
and judgment of the administrative body.' 8
Despite the validity of each of the foregoing rationales supporting an exhaustion requirement, litigants have often sought to circumvent the rule by asserting one of the numerous exceptions to the
12See Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947); Macauley v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).
It has been noted that the courts may lack the experience necessary to recognize
relevant local considerations and may be unable to foresee the ultimate consequences of
any decision. See Note, Exhaustion of State Adininistrative Remedies Under the Civil
Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV. 565, 567 (1975).
13 See JAFFE, supra note 5, at 425.

McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969).
See Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 767 (1947), wherein
the Court stated:
The very purpose of providing either an exclusive or an initial and preliminary administrative determination is to secure the administrative judgment
either, in the one case, in substitution for judicial decision or, in the other, as
foundation for or perchance to make unnecessary later judicial proceedings.
See also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969).
16 See North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S.
156, 159-60 (1973); Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124-25 (1945).
17 JAFFE, supra note 5, at 424-25.
18 Id.
14
15
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requirement.' 9 These exceptions are premised on practical considerations, with the courts striving "to balance 'rights against rules.' -20
The exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required
when agency jurisdiction is challenged. 2 ' Such a result may be explained by the fact that the "suit is not one to 'review' " a decision of
the agency but "[r]ather it is one to strike down an order . . . made
in excess of [the agency's] delegated powers." 22 However, it is unclear whether an allegation of lack of jurisdiction alone is sufficient to

eliminate the requirement of exhaustion. 23 It has been held, for example, that in the absence of a showing of immediate and irreparable
harm, a jurisdictional challenge is insufficient. 24 Furthermore, when
19 See generally DAVIS, supra note 1, §§ 20.01-09 (Supp. 1970); JAFFE, supra note
5, at 426-29; Layton & Fine, supra note 6, at 322-29.
20 Graham, The Federal Courts and Exhaustion of State Remedies, 36 CONN. B.J.
60, 64 (1962).
21 See generally 3 DAVIS, supra note 1, §§ 21.02-03 (1958).
22 Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958). See also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963). An agency's jurisdiction may
also be challenged because of the manner in which a statutory power is exerted. See
Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
23 Professor Davis has suggested that courts consider three "key factors" in determining whether administrative remedies must be exhausted when lack of jurisdiction is
asserted. These factors are:
extent of injury from pursuit of administrative remedy, degree of apparent clar-

ity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and involvement of specialized
administrative understanding in the question of jurisdiction.
DAVIS, supra note 1, § 20.03, at 69 (Supp. 1970) (footnote omitted). These factors were
considered by the courts in Lone Star Cement Corp. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 505, 510-12 (9th
Cir. 1964), and Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 235 F. Supp. 606, 607 (D. Colo. 1964).
24 See Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 218-23
(1938).
Certain pecuniary losses have been held to be irreparable. See, e.g., Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 293 (1923) (plaintiff not required to exhaust
remedies which failed to compensate for property claimed to be taken contrary to law).
However, in other cases the courts have not deemed monetary losses to be irreparable.
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746-48 (1974) (revocation of taxexempt status not deemed irreparable harm); Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing
Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (litigation expenses, even though "substantial and unrecoupable," are not irreparable injury); Allen v. Grand Ctnt. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 539-40
(1954) (allegation of weakening of bank credit insufficient to establish irreparable
injury); Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953), rev'g 114 F. Supp. 392
(N.D. Tex. 1953) (possibility of a large penalty in the form of a disallowance for tax
purposes does not constitute irreparable injury).
The cases dealing with intangible injuries are difficult to categorize. It has been
held that the mere "burden of submitting to agency hearings" does not constitute irreparable harm. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1972). And,
in Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1938), the Supreme
Court failed to find irreparable damage despite allegations of "serious impairment of the
good will and harmonious relations existing between the Corporation and its employees."
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the constitutionality of the underlying statute has been challenged,
"[o]nly the courts have authority to take action which runs counter to
the expressed will of the legislative body." 25 Thus, exhaustion will not
be required.
The exhaustion doctrine will not be applied where the prescribed

26
administrative remedy is clearly inadequate to protect the claim.
Thus, where there exists no available administrative procedure for
challenging the validity of a regulation, the exhaustion doctrine is
unquestionably inapplicable. 27 Another exception arises when the
available administrative remedy has been unreasonably delayed. In
this situation the exhaustion rule will not be strictly applied. 2 8 Finally, the courts, in some instances, have not required exhaustion of
the remedy when such action would be futile because it is certain
that the claim would be denied.29
Perhaps the most significant erosion of the exhaustion doctrine
has occurred in actions brought under section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code. Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon those

§ 20.04, at 654 (Supp. 1970). In Public Util. Comm'n v.
it was stated that
534
(1958),
355
U.S.
United States,
where the only question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative procedure onto the litigant, the administrative agency may be defied and
judicial relief sought as the only effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right.
Id. at 540. But see W\.E. B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 311-12
(1967) (without exhaustion, "important and difficult constitutional issues would be decided devoid of factual context and before it was clear that appellants were covered by
the Act"). Professor Davis has suggested that the reasoning set forth in the Public
Utilities case might have been equally applicable to the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs case,
particularly in view of the fact that pursuit of the administrative remedy was "not only
inadequate but clearly futile." DAVIS, supra note 1, § 20.04, at 654 (Supp. 1970).
26 See United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 240 (1946); Kelly v.
Board of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272, 277 (M.D. Tenn. 1958). See also Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 524 (1947); United States Alkali Export Ass'n
v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210 (1945).
27 See Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); cf. Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 229 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 372 U.S. 10
(1963). But, where the agency remedy is unavailable to the petitioner through his own
fault, judicial review may be denied. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 791-93
(1948).
28 See, e.g., Walker v. Southern Ry., 385 U.S. 196 (1966) (delay of ten years); Smith
v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590-91 (1926) (delay of five years); Southeastern
Oil Florida, Inc. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 198, 201 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (delay of two and
one-half years). For an extended discussion of the effect of unreasonable delay in the
administrative proceeding see Note, Judicial Acceleration of the Administrative Process: The Right to Relief From Unduly ProtractedProceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 574 (1963).
29 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24, 34 (1934); Montana Nat'l
Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928); Spanish Int'l Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 385 F.2d 615, 626 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
25 DAVIS, supra note 1,
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who, acting under color of state law, deprive an individual of a federally protected right. 30 Recent Supreme Court cases have indicated
that failure to exhaust adequate state remedies does not necessarily
preclude federal relief in actions instituted under section 1983. 3 1 Although the precise limits of this exception to the exhaustion requirement remain undefined, the section 1983 remedy is considered to
be supplementary to the state remedy. 32 The significance of this extended federal intervention in matters that might otherwise be dealt
with by state or local agencies has had its greatest impact in the area
of state prisoner litigation. Effective elimination of the exhaustion requirement in state prisoner cases has contributed to the overburdening of the federal court docket. 3 3 Although imposition of a specific
exhaustion rule in prisoner cases might alleviate the federal caseload,
this beneficial result must be balanced against the possibility of any
consequent deterioration in the protection of prisoners' cognizable
rights. The inadequacy of current administrative remedies to redress
deprivations of prisoners' rights, as well as the importance of the noexhaustion doctrine to the spirit of the civil rights laws, militates
against an absolute court-ordered return to exhaustion for the sake of
expediency alone. This Comment traces the development of the noexhaustion rule in state prisoner cases, explores the administrative
remedies available to resolve prisoner complaints, and suggests that,
if accompanied by appropriate procedural safeguards, some of the
existing administrative remedies may adequately protect prisoners'
rights and thus justify the imposition of a new exhaustion requirement
in state prisoner cases.
SECI ON 19083 AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF No-EXHAUSTION

The nature of the relationship between section 1983 and the exhaustion rule cannot be properly analyzed without some inquiry into
the history of the statute. Section 1983 was passed shortly after the
end of the Civil War 3 4 when the activities of the Ku Klux Klan
brought a reign of terror to the southeastern portion of the United
States. 35 Congress was apprised of the futility of the Klan's victims
30 See note 37 infra.
31 See notes 43-63 infra and accompanying text.
32 See notes 47-49 infra and accompanying text.

33 See notes 136-40 infra and accompanying text.
11 Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
35 For a description of the activities which prompted congressional action see
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1973); STATUTORY HISTORY OF
THE UNIrED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 603 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
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seeking relief on the local level 36 and responded by creating a federal
remedy which permitted a private civil action for damages or equitable relief or both against those who, acting under color of law, deprived a person of a federally protected right.37 The scope of the act's
protection against state action is as great as that of the fourteenth
amendment.3 8 However, the potentially sweeping effect of section
1983 has in the past been mitigated, in part, by the application of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 39
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape40 in
1961, there was substantial support for the proposition that administrative exhaustion was required before a federal district court would
entertain a civil rights action. 4 ' However, the breadth of the SuSchwartz]; Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1492 (1969).
36 Several judges from the Southeast expressed the view that indictments and convictions were simply not forthcoming as a result of Klan pressure. Schwartz, supra note
35, at 601-03. As the Supreme Court observed in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180
(1961):
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of
citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
37 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction to hear
civil rights actions.
38 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), wherein the Court stated
that
"[aillegation of facts constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies" the requirement of section 1983.
39 See note 41 infra.
The effect of section 1983 was necessarily limited until the recent incorporation of
various guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. See Daykin, The
Constitutional Doctrine of Incorporation Re-Examined, 5 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV.
61, 62-63 (1970); Note, supra note 35, at 1486.
A further limitation of the effectiveness of the section has resulted from the application of general abstention principles. See note 79 infra.
40 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
41 See Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910
(1957). In Carson, a school desegregation case, the court held that plaintiffs had to seek
relief from local educational authorities because
[i]t is to be presumed that these [authorities] will obey the law, observe the
standards prescribed by the legislature, and avoid the discrimination on account
of race which the Constitution forbids. Not until they have been applied to and
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preme Court's language in Monroe and subsequent section 1983
cases has led most jurisdictions to conclude that the exhaustion requirement is irrelevant to section 1983.42

In Monroe, the seminal decision on the issue, the petitioners
claimed that their constitutional rights had been violated when
Chicago police officers allegedly conducted an unreasonable search
and seizure in their home. 43 The district court dismissed the section
1983 complaint, which sought only damages. In affirming the judgment below, the court of appeals agreed that a cause of action had
not been stated and noted that the petitioners were not without a
remedy in the state courts. 44 The Supreme Court reversed this
judgment, holding both that a cause of action had been stated and
that petitioners could seek relief in a federal forum pursuant to section 1983.

45

have failed to give relief should the courts be asked to interfere in school administration.
238 F.2d at 728. See also Parham v. Dove, 271 F.2d 132, 137-39 (8th Cir. 1959); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies in Suits Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 1201, 1201 (1968); Note, supra note 35, at 1500.
42 See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). In McNeese, the Court
stated that "relief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not
first sought under state law which provided a remedy." Id. at 671. Quoting from Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), the Court declared that
"[i]t is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief.
The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need
not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked."
373 U.S. at 671.
In a recent decision, Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975), the Court indicated that it
continues to adhere to the position that section 1983 has no exhaustion requirements
whatever. The Court stated "we have long held that an action under § 19-83 is frep f
that requirement." Id. at 432-33. Other recent cases in which the Court has advanced
the no-exhaustion view are Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974); and Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 670-71
(1972).
A majority of the circuits have interpreted the Supreme Court's position to allow a
section 1983 action without first resorting to exhaustion of judicial or administrative
remedies. See, e.g., Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 296-97 (5th Cir. 1975); McCray v.
Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 361-65 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975); Hartmann v.
Scott, 488 F.2d 1215, 1223 (8th Cir. 1973); Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073,
1079-81 (3d Cir. 1973); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 1972); LeVier v.
Woodson, 443 F.2d 360, 361 (10th Cir. 1971). For a discussion of the positions adhered
to by other circuits see notes 65-73 infra and accompanying text.
43365 U.S. at 169.

44Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365, 365-66 (7th Cir. 1959).
45365 U.S. at 183, 187.
In reinstating the cause of action, the Monroe Court determined that an official's
abuse of governmental authority was conduct under color of law within the meaning of
section 1983. Id. at 172. This conclusion was based on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941), wherein the "under
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The Court recognized that historically the statute has had three
purposes: to "override certain kinds of state laws"; to provide a remedy where no adequate state remedy existed; and to provide a remedy
where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was unavailable
in practice. 46 However, although Monroe might have recovered
damages in a state action pursuant to state law, the Court noted that
"[t]he federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked." 47 The Monroe opinion left unclear whether providing a
supplementary remedy was one of the purposes of section 1983. It
was not until the Court's decision in McNeese v. Board of Education 48 that the provision of a supplemental remedy came to be recog49
nized as a fourth purpose of the statute.
In McNeese, the Court confronted the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, rather than, as in Monroe, exhaustion of state
judicial remedies. The McNeese petitioners sought equitable relief
from what they alleged to be an unconstitutional assignment of public
school students to classrooms on a racial basis. 50 The respondents
color of" phrase as used in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970), was under consideration. 365 U.S. at
183-87. The Classic Court had to determine whether the actions of Commissioners of
Elections of Louisiana, consisting of the willful alteration and false counting of ballots
in a Democratic Party primary, constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1946), as
amended, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970). 313 U.S. at 307. Section 52 provided in pertinent part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States .. .shall be
fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Holding that the acts of the officials were under color of law, the Classic Court stated that
[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
"under color of" state law.
313 U.S. at 326.
This aspect of the Alonroe case was the focus of discussion when the opinion was
initially announced. See, e.g., Alfange, "Under Color of Law": Classic and Screws
Revisited. 47 CORNELL L.Q. 395 (1962); The Supreme Court. 1960 Term, 75 HARv. L.
REV. 40, 211-16 (1961); 4 ARIz. L. REV. 105 (1962); 1961 DUKE L.J. 452; 15 VAND. L.
REV. 267 (1961).
46 365 U.S. at 173-74.
47Id. at 183.
It has been suggested that because Monroe was an action for damages, rather than
for equitable relief, there existed some question regarding whether federal courts had
the option of refusing to act. Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies in Suits Under
the Civil Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (1968). See Potwora v. Dillon, 386
F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1967), wherein Judge Friendly observed that "Monroe v. Pape was
an action for damages and .. .must be read in that light."
48 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
49Id. at 672.
50 Id. at 669-70.
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moved to dismiss on the ground that petitioners had failed to exhaust
their state administrative remedies. 5 ' The court of appeals affirmed
2
dismissal of the complaint on the same ground. 5
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to require petitioners
to exhaust the available remedies would defeat the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act, as outlined in Monroe.5 3 The Court explained that
claims of deprivation of fourteenth amendment rights are entitled to
be heard in a federal court and noted that federal courts have no
"'right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because
the
rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.' "54 Thus,
McNeese apparently extended the Monroe holding by concluding that
administrative as well as judicial remedies need not be exhausted
when the action is brought under section 1983 because the remedy
provided by the statute is supplementary to any state remedy.
However, the Court's expression of doubt as to the protection
afforded by the available state remedy in McNeese55 lends credence
to the position that the administrative exhaustion requirement may
still have vitality in a civil rights action. 5 6 This is so since even under
51Id. at 670. The available administrative procedure required the petitioners to file
a notice, which was to be signed by a specified number of the residents of the school
district, with the Superintendent of Public Instruction. The superintendent was empowered to rescind recognition of the guilty school district after a hearing on the matter.
Such a revocation would result in a termination of state funding. The superintendent
could simultaneously request the state attorney general to bring suit to rectify the
school's action. Id. at 675.
52 305 F.2d 783, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1962), aff'g 199 F. Supp. 403 (E.D. Ill. 1961).
53373 U.S. at 672, 676.
5aId. at 674 & n.6 (quoting from Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan.),
appeal disoiissed per stipulation sub nooe. Mitcheli v. \'icEhoy, 326 U.S. 690 (1945)).
55 373 U.S. at 674-75.
56A majority of courts have read McNeese to totally eliminate the exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640-41 (1968); Moreno v.
Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1970); Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir.
1969); Powell v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131, 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
McNeese has been interpreted by some courts to apply only in the case where state
remedies are inadequate. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Potwora v. Dillon, 386 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1967)
(dictum). Finally, it has been held that McNeese applies only to situations involving
administrative remedies which are judicial in character. See Metcalf v. Swank, 444 F.2d
1353, 1355 (7th Cir. 1971), vacated and reosanded, 406 U.S. 914 (1972). Metcalf has been
noted in 17 VILL. L. REV. 336 (1971). See also Note, Exhaustion of State Administrative
Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV. 565, 573-74 & nn.40-43 (1975).
The Second Circuit maintained that the leading Supreme Court cases on the matter
should be read "as simply condemning a wooden application of the exhaustion doctrine" in section 1983 cases. Eisen v. Eastman, supra at 568-69. The court examined the
available remedies in each of the cases and determined for itself that either they were
inadequate or a petition for relief would have been futile. Id. It failed to consider
whether the AlcNeese interpretation of the statute as presenting a supplementary federal
remedy foreclosed an examination of the adequacy of the available remedy.
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traditional exhaustion principles, a plaintiff is not required to pursue
an administrative remedy if the plaintiff can show that such pursuit
would be futile or that the agency lacks jurisdiction to grant the re57
quested relief.
No such qualifying language, however, appeared in Damico v.
California,58 where the petitioners, seeking damages and equitable
relief pursuant to section 1983, alleged that California's Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program had discriminated against them in violation of their fourteenth amendment
rights. 5 9 Under the federally created AFDC program, "a fair hearing"
by a state agency is required for those families whose claims are "not
acted upon with reasonable promptness." 60 Finding that the petitioners " 'failed to exhaust adequate administrative remedies,' " the
district court dismissed the action. 6 1 The Supreme Court summarily
reversed in a brief per curiam opinion without examining the adequacy of the available remedy. The Court simply reaffirmed the
principle that relief under section 1983 may not be denied in a federal forum on the ground that the state law provides an administrative remedy. 62 The Court emphasized that one of the purposes of the
statute is to provide a supplementary federal remedy for an alleged
violation of a federally secured right.6 3 Implicit in the Court's opinion
was a recognition that to require exhaustion of a state remedy would
undermine that purpose.
Although a majority of lower courts have applied the noexhaustion rule,' 4 some uncertainty remains for the prospective litigant because of the development of minority approaches which,
under certain circumstances, require the section 1983 plaintiff first to
avail himself of state administrative remedies. Analysis of these
minority positions indicates that only one approach appears viable
under the existing Supreme Court decisions, while the others are
clearly subject to challenge.
The most vulnerable position is that adhered to by the Second
Circuit. Reading the leading Supreme Court cases merely to con5'See

notes 21-29 supra and accompanying text.

58 389 U.S. 416 (1967). For a discussion of Damico see Comment, supra note 47.

59 389 U.S. at 416. The alleged discrimination resulted from a requirement that before aid would be granted to a family which the father had deserted, a waiting period of
three months had to be observed, unless the mother had filed suit for divorce. Id. at 417
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
60 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4) (1964).
61 389 U.S. at 416-17 (quoting from the unpublished opinion of the district court).
62 Id.
63

at 417.

Id.

11 See

note 42 supra.
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demn a rigid approach in civil rights actions, 6 5 the circuit has in practice taken a flexible approach-considering the no-exhaustion question on a case-by-case basis-while consistently maintaining that the
administrative exhaustion requirement is still the rule in the circuit.66
The basic factor to be considered is whether the available remedy
is adequate; and, more often than not, a plaintiff's action has not been
barred because of his failure to exhaust. 67
A clearer approach, but one which is still subject to challenge,
is that promulgated by the First Circuit. The circuit requires that
the complainant exhaust his administrative remedy, at least to the extent of an initial application to, and a determination by, the state
authority. 68 Absent such a determination, the action of a local institution would not be considered final, and therefore the prospective
plaintiff's case would not be ripe for judicial determination.6 9 The
65 Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841

(1970). In analyzing McNeese, Damico, Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968), and
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the court determined that in each case the plaintiff
would not have been required to exhaust due to the inadequacy of the remedy or the
futility of seeking relief from the administrative agency. 421 F.2d at 569.
66 See, e.g., James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1042 (1972); Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section
1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 545-46 (1974).
67 In Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973), the court found that a
failure to exhaust did not constitute an "absolute bar" to the claims of the plaintiffs, but
such failure .. .can be taken as one of the factors to be weighed in determining
whether these plaintiffs were deprived of any of their constitutional rights.
Id. at 384. In both Plano v. Baker, 504 F.2d 595, 597 (2d Cir. 1974), and Ray v. Fritz,
468 F.2d 586, 587 (2d Cir. 1972), the court found the available remedies inadequate and
did not require exhaustion before proceeding to the merits.
68See Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 751 n.3 (ist Cii. 1973). The First Circuit
pointed out that, to the extent its earlier opinons indicated an automatic exhaustion
requirement, they were rejected. Id. However, it would continue to
adhere to our view of the necessity for ripeness to the extent that there must be
at least some definitive administrative or institutional determination before a
§ 1983 action may arise.
ld.
69 Id. Raper adopted the view previously expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F,2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970). 488
F.2d at 751 n.3. The Stevenson court stated that Monroe and Damico should not be read
to hold that federal courts may intervene in school board matters before an institutional
decision is finalized; i.e., when there has been a denial of relief by the school board. 426
F.2d at 1157. Finality has been compared to the ripeness aspect of the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. Note, Exhaustion
of State Administrative Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV. 565, 568
(1975).
Whether the alleged deprivation has in fact occurred or is merely threatened is
irrelevant. See Stevenson v. Board of Educ., supra at 1157, where, although the plaintiff
students had already been suspended, the court made it clear that, but for the testimony
of various board members that the suspension would have been upheld, exhaustion
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circuit maintains that the requirement is also justified on the ground
that administrative personnel should not be held personally liable
when they have not yet had the opportunity to correct an alleged
deprivation. 70
A similar approach has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, but
the application of the administrative exhaustion requirement is
limited to those situations where the alleged harm is merely
threatened. Exhaustion has been justified on the basis that administrative action may well render the case moot. 71 As a prerequisite to a
determination that the plaintiff must exhaust, the circuit requires
that the adequacy of the remedy appear on the record before it. 72
Failure to exhaust an adequate administrative remedy is considered
an acceptance of the threatened harm and results in a waiver of
rights. Thus, a plaintiff's complaint may be dismissed for failure to
73
state a claim.
Of the diverse approaches among the minority circuits, only the
Ninth Circuit view, requiring exhaustion where it may forestall a
merely threatened harm, finds support in a Supreme Court decision.
would have been required. The substantive aspect of this case is discussed in 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1702 (1971).
70 Beattie v. Roberts, 436 F.2d 747, 748-49 (lst Cir. 1971). See also Dunham v.
Crosby, 435 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 n.2 (1st Cir. 1970).
71 See Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 28-29 (9th Cir. 1969). The plaintiff in this case
was a tenured member of a state college faculty who challenged the legality of her
discharge in a section 1983 action. Id. at 26-27. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. The court of appeals remanded for a determination of the adequacy of the available remedy. Id. at 27-29. The
court noted that Mrs. Whitner would not have been required to exhaust "[i]f the state
administrative remedy ...were designed to provide a means of obtaining relief from ...
a deprivation of civil rights which had already occurred." Id. at 28. However, because
the plaintiff could have presented her views to the "Senate Personnel" committee or
the board of trustees before her discharge became effective, the available administrative remedy could have forestalled a deprivation, thereby leaving Mrs. Whitner with
no complaint. Id.
72 Id. at 29.
73Id. at 28-29; Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953, 956-57 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1130 (1973). It has been stated that the waiver aspect of the Whitner case "can
be justified only as a deterrent" against those who have intentionally avoided using the
state administrative machinery. The need to protect constitutional rights from arbitrary
state action "should be sufficient to defeat application of the waiver doctrine." McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections,Part I1,60 VA. L. REV. 250, 294-95 (1974).
Three years after Whitner, in Padilla v. Ackerman, 460 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1972), it
appeared that the Ninth Circuit had moved toward an abrogation of the exhaustion requirement. Although deciding the case on the basis of abstension, the court noted that
exhaustion was not required in actions predicated upon section 1983. Id. at 479. However, in Canton v. Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1974), the
Whitner position was clearly reestablished.

1976]

COMMENTS

In Gibson v. Berryhill,74 the Court was confronted with a constitutional challenge to Alabama statutes which regulated the practice of
optometry. 75 Administrative proceedings at the state level had already been initiated, and the plaintiff could not have suffered injury
until the completion of those hearings. 76 Finding that bias existed in
the tribunal, the Court did not reach the question of whether exhaustion was required under the circumstances. 77 However, the Court
did state that where the alleged harm was yet to occur and proceedings before an impartial tribunal had already been initiated,
the exhaustion question was an open one. 78 It thus appears that the
Ninth Circuit approach may well be within the permissible limits of
Supreme Court thinking on the exhaustion question, with one proviso. Unlike the Ninth Circuit approach, the Gibson decision reflected a concern for the fact that the state administrative proceedings
were pending, a concern consistent with the doctrine of federal abstention from equitable intervention where state judicial proceedings
have already been initiated. 79
74 411 U.S. 564 (1973).

7

Id. at 567-70.
id. at 574-75.
77 Id. at 575, 578.
78 See id. at 574-75.
79 When a case raises questions of both state and federal law, a federal court may
abstain temporarily from hearing the action. McCormack, supra note 73, at 265. Abstention is founded upon two principles. First, where a statute is constitutionally challenged, the federal court should abstain if the state courts have not yet had the opportunity to issue a definitive interpretation and if such an interpretation could resolve the
alleged infirmity. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498-501
.........
issuingrelieffr.......
(1941). S],,nd, a federal court should abstain from
ing or ongoing state criminal proceeding unless the plaintiff can show the threat of great
and immediate, irreparable harm or other extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g.,
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971). The Younger abstention principle was
recently extended in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). The plaintiff in
Huffman instituted a section 1983 action in federal court after he had been enjoined
from displaying pornographic films for one year. The injunction issued from a state
court as a result of a nuisance proceeding instituted by local officials. Id. at 598. The
federal district court held that the state statute which authorized the closure was an
unconstitutional impairment of the plaintiff's first amendment rights and permanently
enjoined execution of the judgment. Id. at 599. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that irreparable harm, both great and immediate,
must be demonstrated "to justify federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding
[when] a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies." Id. at 609,
612-13 (footnote omitted). The Court reasoned that the proceedings in question were
closely akin to criminal proceedings since the state was a party and the local courts had
relied upon definitions of obscenity contained in the state's criminal statute. Id. at 596
n.4, 604. Thus, an extension of the Younger principles was considered to be proper.
Id. 604.
Concerned that its conclusion might be interpreted as undercutting the ruling in
76
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Although abstention considerations are apparently not present in
the Ninth Circuit requirement, exhaustion where only a threat of injury exists can be justified. Under section 1983, the plaintiff is required to show (a) conduct under color of law which (b) subjects him
to a deprivation of right.8 0 Where the alleged harm is merely
threatened, no deprivation has yet occurred. Since the plaintiff cannot
show element (b), he has failed to state a cause of action. 8 ' Ultimately, it remains to be determined whether the fact that the state
administrative proceedings are pending and the fact that plaintiff's
harm is merely threatened must both be present in order to require
exhaustion, or whether each stands independently as a sufficient
ground for requiring exhaustion. Whether the Ninth Circuit theory
stands or falls depends upon the Supreme Court's response to this
question.
No such questions remain undecided, however, upon analysis of
the First and Second Circuit approaches in light of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of section 1983 and the language of the statute
itself. When a plaintiff alleges an actual, as opposed to threatened,
deprivation of a federally secured right, he has stated a prima facie
case. Monroe, McNeese, and Darnico dictate that the federal forum
should remain open to the plaintiff because the remedy provided by
section 1983 is a supplementary one. The Supreme Court explained,
in examining the legislative history of the statute, that with the passage of the post-Civil War legislation,
Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary
to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the
hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims. 82
Absent countervailing considerations of abstention such as those present in Gibson, and absent the failure of the plaintiff to state a substantive claim as in the Ninth Circuit theory, it becomes extremely
Monroe, the Huffman Court distinguished the two cases by noting that Monroe "had
nothing to do with the problem . . . of the deference to be accorded state proceedings
which have already been initiated." Id. at 609-10 n.21.
Dicta in Gibson indicate that the same deference federal courts show to state court
proceedings may "in proper circumstances" be accorded state administrative proceedings. 411 U.S. at 576-77. See also Geiger v. Jenkins, 316 F. Supp. 370, 371-73 n.8 (N.D.
Ga. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
90 McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement
of Constitutional Protections, Part 1, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1974).
81 Cf. Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24, 28-29 (9th Cir. 1969). Once the mere threat
has matured into an actual deprivation, however, a plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with his claim. See note 73 supra.
82 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (emphasis added).
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difficult to justify imposing the exhaustion requirement as the First
and Second Circuits have done. The two approaches, therefore, remain open to forceful challenges.
PRISONER CASES, SECTION 1983, AND THE
No-EXHAUSTION RULE

Over the past fifteen years, a growing body of law has greatly
expanded prisoners' substantive rights and protected the exercise
of those rights. 83 This expansion has been accomplished through
both the increased use of the writ of habeas corpus, which may be
sought not only to gain release but also to challenge conditions of
confinement, and by the greater availability of section 1983. Concomitantly, courts have almost entirely abandoned the "hands-off"
doctrine, a concept which permitted courts to refuse jurisdiction
84
in prisoner cases.
8 First amendment protections have clearly been extended to prisoners, albeit in
limited form. In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), California regulations permitting censorship of prisoners' mail were held unconstitutional. Censorship could be
justified only upon a showing of a substantial governmental interest, and the limitation
on correspondence could be no greater than necessary or essential to further the governmental interest. Id. at 413-14. For a further discussion of Procunier see Note,
Prisoners-StateMust Show "Substantial Governmental Interest" to Justify Censorship
of Inmates' Personal Mail and Must Allow Lay Investigators Access to Prisons, 6
SETON HALL L. REV. 167 (1974). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). In Cruz,
the Court held that allegations claiming that prison authorities had refused to allow the
petitioner to practice his religion stated a cause of action under section 1983. Id. at
319-23.
It is also settled that the shield of the equal protection clause protects state prisoners. The Court held in Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333-34 (1968), that prison
.ourteenth
classifications based on race are violative of the fourteenth amendment. Thu
amendment also guarantees state prisoners the right to reasonable access to the courts.
See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). The due process clause of that
amendment insures procedural fairness where state action impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974)
(requiring procedural safeguards at disciplinary hearings); Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F.
Supp. 85, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (prisoner's allegation that his personal property was
taken without due process stated a cause of action under section 1983). See also Lokey
v. Richardson, 527 F.2d 949, 952-53 (9th Cir. 1975) (revocation of prisoner's minimum
security classification which "deprived him of highly significant privileges" may constitute loss of liberty to which procedural protections of the due process clause attach).
State prisoners are also protected by the eighth amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
For a comprehensive survey of prisoners' substantive rights see H. KERPER & J.
KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 277-490 (1974). See also Note, Prisoners'
Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1281-94 (1969).
s4 For a comprehensive discussion and critique of the "hands-off" doctrine' see
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). For cases and materials indicating the

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 366

The "hands-off" approach is a discretionary refusal to exercise
judicial power. The exercise of such discretion has been justified on
several grounds: 85 separation of powers between the judicial and executive branches of the federal government; 86 lack of judicial expertise in penal matters; 87 a concern that judicial intervention would undermine discipline;8 8 and a reluctance on the part of the federal
judiciary to interfere with state sovereignty. 89 As tales of official
cruelty and arbitrariness spread beyond the walls of the prisons, the
courts acknowledged that the protection of prisoners' fundamental
rights could not be left to the unrestrained discretion of prison
administrators. 90 Thus, the difficult obstacle of the "hands-off" doctrine was removed, and the courts became available to vindicate
prisoners' rights.
changing judicial attitude towards the "hands-off" doctrine see S.

KRANTZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 297-324 (1973).

15 See Goldfarb & Singer, Redressing Prisoners'Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
175, 181 (1970).
6 The separation of powers principle applies in cases involving federal prisoners.
By statute, authority over prison affairs is vested in the Attorney General of the United
States. 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1970). See United States v. Marchese, 341 F.2d 782, 789 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967), wherein the doctrine was held to preclude
judicial action on a prisoner's complaint.
87In 1974 the Supreme Court expressed the view that-the administration of prisoners requires the "expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources
all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive
branches." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974). See also Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 WNI. & MARY L. REV. 178 (1967), which stated
that the complexity of the administrator's task has "resulted in a deep reluctance on the
part of the courts to review the decisions" of corrections officials. Id. at 179.
81 See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 85, at 181; Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L. J. 1270, 1274 (1969).
89 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957). The court in Atterbury held that an allegation of
numerous assaults upon a state prisoner did not state a cause of action under section
1983. 237 F.2d at 956. Citing its earlier decisions, the court demonstrated that federal
judicial intervention in state penal institutions was extremely limited because of state
sovereignty. Id. at 955-56. See also United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294,
295 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954), wherein the court stated:
The federal courts have held that they do not have the power to control or
regulate the ordinary internal management and discipline of prisons operated
by the states.
90 See, e.g., Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522-23 (2d Cir. 1967). In Wright the
court noted that "a sharp alteration in the [traditional] judicial attitude toward" the
hands-off doctrine had been indicated by recent decisions. The case that most dramatically emphasized the need for judicial intervention on behalf of prisoners was Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). In Holt
the entire state penitentiary system was found to have imposed cruel and unusual
punishment on its inmates, and prison administrators were ordered by the court to make
radical changes in order to conform to constitutional standards. 309 F. Supp. at 382,
383-85.
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Traditionally, the technique most readily available to state prisoners for protecting their rights was habeas corpus. 91 However, because exhaustion requirements apply to the writ 92 and because of the
policy of judicial nonintervention, federal courts infrequently considered the merits of a prisoner's case. When a court did assert jurisdiction, relief would be granted only if the prisoner sought immediate
release from illegal custody. 93
Gradually, however, the form of relief available under the writ
was expanded. In granting relief other than immediate release, the
courts could rely upon the language of the habeas statute permitting
the fashioning of an appropriate remedy to "dispose of the matter as
law and justice require. ' '94 As early as 1894, the Supreme Court
utilized the habeas corpus procedure in a challenge to an aspect of
91 In 1867, legislation was enacted which granted federal courts jurisdiction over
all habeas petitions, including those brought by state prisoners. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.
28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
Other remedies do exist for inmates, but each has its own peculiar deficiency. Thus,
prisoners can bring tort actions to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of
prison officials. However, this remedy may not be available if the prisoners' civil rights
have been suspended by state legislation. Even if the prisoner may proceed, sovereign
immunity may bar the action. Zagaris, Recent Developments in Prison Litigation: Procedural Issues and Remedies, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 810, 811-12 (1974).
A second remedy may be the securing of a writ of mandamus to compel action for
vindication of prisoners' rights. However, since mandamus controls only ministerial
functions and requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, it too is of limited utility.
Id. at 813-14. While the hands-off doctrine is no longer a bar to an assertion of jurisdiction, it still has a "lingering effect" when determinations are made on the merits.
Turner, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice in Prisoner Cases, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK 243, 244 (M. Hermann & M. Haft ed. 1973).
92 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b) (1970) states that "an application for a writ of habeas corpus
... shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available."
93 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 137-39 (1934). In .,cNally the Supreme Court
held that habeas would not lie to challenge the second of two consecutive sentences
when the petitioner was still serving the first. Id. at 133-35. Although McNally
formulated what came to be known as the "'prematurity" doctrine, it frequently barred
habeas petitions which sought less than immediate release until it was expressly overruled in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968). See Comment, State Prisoners' Suits:
Proper Forum, Choice of Remedy, and Effect of Judgment, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 1364,
1377-78 (1973).
94 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1970).
One of the earliest cases supporting the use of the writ to inquire into allegedly
unlawful conditions, consisting of "assaults, cruelties and indignities," is Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945). The court
based its decision on the language of the habeas statute, stating:
The judge is not limited to a simple remand or discharge of the prisoner, but he
may remand with directions that prisoner's retained civil rights be respected.
143 F.2d at 445. Where confinement violates a federally protected right, the custody is
unlawful, and habeas corpus lies to correct the illegality. Developments in the LawFederal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1085 (1970).
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incarceration, other than the fact of custody. In In re Bonner,95 the
petitioner successfully challenged the place of confinement on jurisdictional grounds. 9 6 The scope of the habeas writ was further expanded
with the Court's decision in Ex parte Hull,9 7 in which a prison regulation requiring the prisoner to submit his legal papers to prison
authorities for inspection was held unconstitutional in a habeas
proceeding. 9 8 The Hull decision made it clear that the federal courts
could scrutinize those state prison regulations and those activities of
prison administrators which affected the conditions of confinement. 99
The limits of habeas have been further extended to the point where a
prisoner may now challenge any condition of confinement, if that
condition impinges upon a constitutionally protected right.10 0
Inherent in the habeas procedure, however, are certain limitations which are not encountered in a section 1983 action: damages are
not available in an action brought under the writ; 10 1 discovery is
limited under the statute providing for habeas relief,10 2 and, perhaps
9- 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
96 Id.
at 254-55, 262. The petitioner was convicted in a federal court but was ordered to serve his sentence in the state penitentiary. Id. at 243, 254. The place of his
confinement was challenged on the ground that the federal court did not have the jurisdiction to imprison him in a state institution. Id. at 254. The writ issued but the Supreme Court noted that the lower federal court could reassert its jurisdiction to confine
petitioner in the appropriate federal institution. Id. at 262.
97 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
98 Id. at 547-49. It has been suggested that the Hull decision was somewhat "irregular," since it was decided at a time when the McNally prematurity rule was being
widely followed. The result, it was argued, was "necessitated by threats to the writ."
Comment, supra note 93, at 1380. However, the case may also be read as modifying
McNally since the Hull petitioner, while challenging a second conviction, was serving
out a sentence under the first. 312 U.S. at 549-50.
99 Despite the Bonner and Hull decisions, lower federal courts remained reluctant
to intervene-on the basis of "hands-off"-unless the prisoner's objective was release
from custody. See Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners:The Developing Law, 110 U.
PA. L. REV. 985, 986-87 (1962).
0
'( See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); Flannery, Habeas Corpus
Bores a Hole in Prisoners' Civil Rights Actions-An Analysis of Preiser v. Rodriguez,
48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 104, 110 (1973); Zagaris, supra note 91, at 820.
01 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 494 (1973).
102 28 U.S.C. § 2246 (1970) provides that discovery be limited to affidavits and depositions. If affidavits, which may only be taken with the court's permission, are admitted, "any party shall have the right to propound written interrogatories to the affiants."
Id.
In Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), the Court held that it was within the
district court's discretion to "authorize the use of suitable discovery procedures" so that
an appropriate disposition of the case could be made. Id. at 290. The Court also held,
however, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply to the habeas proceeding. Id. at 298. Two reasons supported this conclusion. The legislative history of
the rules and of habeas corpus indicated that Congress did not intend the rules to apply,
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most importantly, the habeas petitioner is required to have exhausted
adequate state remedies available before filing his complaint.' 0 3 Thus,
section 1983, which presents no such obstacles, provides a much more
effective vehicle for vindicating state prisoners' rights.
The opportunity to elect to bring either a section 1983 action or
a habeas action would not have been possible without the Court's
decision in Monroe. Although the Supreme Court had previously
held that unauthorized action by an agent of the state which resulted
in a civil rights deprivation was conduct under color of law for the purpose of attaching criminal liability, 10 4 the question of whether misuse
of state-delegated power was conduct under color of law for the purpose of attaching civil liability pursuant to section 1983 remained an
open one.' 0 5 Thus, state prisoners could not use section 1983 to vindicate their rights since one essential element of the civil rights action
could not be demonstrated, namely, that the defendant prison officials
were acting under color of law.' 0 6 Monroe's holding that the police
and the application of the rules would unnecessarily burden the courts and delay remedying the wrong. Id. at 294-98.
103 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1970) provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or
the existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the prisoner.
The exhaustion requirement was initially formulated by an early Court decision
because of strong considerations of federalism and comity. See Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S.
241, 251-53 (1886). It is significant to note that the exhaustion requirement is in reality
a discretionary doctrine which has no relationship to the power of a lederai court to
hear a habeas corpus proceeding. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 417-26 (1963). Thus,
the petitioner who has failed to timely appeal in the state courts will not be barred from
relief in the federal courts on the ground that he has failed to exhaust state remedies, so
long as he did not deliberately evade the state's process. Id. at 433-35.
104 See note 45 supra.
105 Although the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the question, several circuits
had already construed the "under color of" language in section 1983 to have the same
meaning as it had in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)-the statute which attaches criminal liability for violation of another's civil rights. See, e.g., Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714,
717 (7th Cir. 1953); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 248 (3d Cir. 1945).
These courts anticipated Monroe by referring to United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299,
326 (1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107-08 (1945), both of which had
concluded that misuse of state-delegated authority was conduct under color of law sufficient to establish a criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
But despite the fact that some jurisdictions had adopted a broad interpretation, the
defense of official immunity often precluded a complainant from recovering damages.
Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARV. L. REV.
1229, 1231 (1955).
106But see Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. I11. 1948). In Gordon the
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search and seizure, illegal under Illinois law, was conduct under color
of law for section 1983 purposes, 10 7 provided that missing link.
Another significant development which further increased the
federal courts' power to intervene was the recognition of additional
interests and rights deemed to be protected by the fourteenth
amendment. 10 8 The limitations on state action vis-a-vis its citizens
may also be held to apply to the state's relationships with its
prisoners. 1' 9 As the constitutional rights of prisoners were recognized, the actions of corrections administrators could more frequently
be challenged as depriving a state prisoner of a federally secured
right. Consequently, prisoners were able to satisfy the second element of a section 1983 action, namely, the violation of a federal right.
The preference that state prisoners soon demonstrated for utilizing the civil rights,, act as the means of challenging conditions of
confinement was encouraged by the Supreme Court's decision in
Houghton v. Shafer. 110 Basing its opinion on the Monroe holding that
section 1983 provided a supplementary federal remedy and the
McNeese holding which seemingly eliminated the administrative exhaustion requirement, the Houghton Court held that state prisoners
were not required to adhere to standards of exhaustion stricter than
those applied to other section 1983 plaintiffs."' Despite the availabilcourt was faced with shocking allegations of brutality on the part of the warden of a
state correctional institution. Apparently the conduct was so egregious that the court
felt compelled to permit the prisoner's action. See id. at 478-80.
107 365 U.S. at 187.
108 See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 18 (1973). As
Judge Friendly indicated, at this point it is easier to list those provisions in the first
eight amendments that have not yet been applied to the states. The unincorporated
provisions are
the Second Amendment guarantee of the right to bear arms; the Third Amendment guarantee regarding the quartering of soldiers; the grand jury requirement
of the Fifth Amendment; the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial in
suits at law where the value in controversy exceeds $20; and finally the Eighth
Amendment that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed."
Id. at 18 n.17.
109 Judge Friendly states that the incorporation of the first and eighth amendments
has provided the basis for challenges to conditions. Id. at 18. To this it might be added
that the courts recognize that prisoners retain protectible liberty and property interests
while incarcerated to which procedural fairness applies. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 557, 564-66 (1974) (state prisoners could not be deprived of good-time
credits, a state-created liberty interest, without a hearing comporting with Court standards); Lathan v. Oswald, 359 F. Supp. 85, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (petitioner's allegation
that he was deprived of forty cartons of cigarettes without due process held sufficient to
state a cause of action).
110 392 U.S. 639 (1968).
M11
Id. at 640.
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ity of narrower grounds for not requiring exhaustion-the futility of
pursuing relief on the state level-the Court stated that resort to the
administrative procedure "[i]n any event" was unnecessary.112
The subsequent Supreme Court decision in Wilwording v.
Swenson 1 1 3 further solidified the applicability of the no-exhaustion exception to prisoner cases where conditions of confinement were attacked. After being denied habeas relief in the state courts, the
petitioner in Wilwording commenced a habeas corpus proceeding in
federal district court, alleging deprivations of constitutional rights
caused by the inadequacy of prison facilities."l 4 The district court
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust other state remedies, and
the court of appeals affirmed. 1 5 In reversing, the Supreme Court
based its decision, in part, upon the principle that, although cognizable in habeas, the petitioner's complaint was "entitled" to be treated
as one under section 1983 to which exhaustion requirements did not
apply. 116 In so ruling, the Court placed the burden of determining
whether a prisoner's habeas petition should be treated as a civil rights
complaint on the lower courts and, by implication, confirmed the position that the two remedies are coextensive, at least where equitable relief was sought from allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions. 117
The expansion in prisoners' litigation capabilities came to a sudden halt with the Court's decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez." 8 Preiser
was a consolidated case which concerned three actions brought in
federal district courts. Each prisoner, without exhausting state remedies, had filed a section 1983 complaint, joined with a petition for
habeas corpus, alleging an unconstitutional deprivation of good-time
credits and seeking injunctive relief to restore those credits. Judgment for the petitioners would have resulted in their immediate

113

Id.
404 U.S. 249 (1971).

114

439 F.2d 1331, 1332 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1971).

112

115 404 U.S. at 249-50.
116 Id. at 251. The Court also held that the habeas exhaustion requirement should
not be read so restrictively as to "erect insuperable or successive barriers to the invocation" of the vrit. Id. at 250. One reason for the Court's holding was the apparent failure
of the state courts to grant a hearing to state prisoners where complaints attacked conditions of confinement. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court stated that the
petitioners should not have been required to pursue alternative state remedies, the effectiveness of which were very much in doubt. Id.
117 See id. at 251. Commentators have been unanimous in giving.such an interpretation to Wilwording. See, e.g., Zagaris, supra note 91, at 825; Comment, supra note 93,
at 1382-83; 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1086 (1972).
11s 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
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release.1 1 9 The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment in favor of the
prisoners, 120 reasoned that a challenge to the length or fact of confinement is governed by the more specific habeas corpus statute
rather than section 1983. The Court concluded that these petitioners
2
should have been required to exhaust their state remedies. ' '
The decision was premised on the fact that one challenging the
legality of a conviction has, as his sole remedy, the writ of habeas
corpus.' 2 2 Finding that a challenge to the fact or length of confinement on the basis of allegedly unconstitutional administrative action
"is just as close to the core of habeas corpus as an attack on
the
prisoner's conviction,' 1 2 3 the Court concluded that to permit the
petitioners to proceed without exhausting state remedies would "frustrate explicit congressional intent."' 2 4 Despite the fact that the
petitioners were not challenging the underlying convictions-thereby
avoiding friction between state and federal courts-the Court concluded that the same considerations of federalism applied to state
administrative procedures.125 The Court pointed out that the subject
of prison affairs is a vital state interest and that comity requires that
the state be given the initial opportunity to correct the errors of its
administrators.' 2 6 Therefore, the petitioners should be required to
exhaust.
The majority was careful to point out that the exhaustion requirement was limited to the situation where a prisoner was seeking
injunctive relief which would result either in his release or in shortening the term of his sentence. Hence, an action for damages for a
deprivation of good-time credits-relief which would not shorten the
term of the sentence--could still proceed under section 1983, and
there would be no exhaustion requirement attached thereto.' 2 7 But
this, as the dissent illustrated, creates an anomaly: A prisoner may
proceed with a habeas petition in state court and simultaneously seek
section 1983 damages in a federal forum, both actions involving
"identical legal and factual questions.' 2 Thus, the very friction
119 Id. at 477-82, 487.
120 Id. at 500. The decision rendered by the Second Circuit sitting en banc, Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1972), "provoked eight separate opinions"
because of the significant questions raised concerning federal judicial intervention in
state prisons. 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1078, 1087 (1972).
121
122

411 U.S. at 489-90.
Id. at 489.

123Id.

Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 490-92.
128 Id. at 492.
127 Id. at 494.
128 Id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124

125
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which the Preiser majority sought to avoid may be heightened as a
29
result of its holding.1
Moreover, it has been suggested that the Court's reliance upon
congressional intent may have been misplaced. It seems fairly clear
that, when the exhaustion requirement was codified, Congress was
primarily concerned with the nullification of state criminal judgments
by federal courts prior to affording state courts an opportunity to correct their own errors.130 The Preiser petitioners were not questioning
the validity of their original convictions by state courts. Rather, their
challenge was aimed at the procedures used to deprive them of
good-time credits. The Court's interpretation of congressional intent,
therefore, appears to be somewhat distorted.
Equally questionable is the Court's attempt to justify exhaustion
on the basis of a comity argument. The Court reasoned that states
should be given the initial opportunity to correct their own administrative errors, just as they have the opportunity to correct errors in
state criminal proceedings. 131 This approach seems singularly inapposite since "an attack on state administrative rather than judicial action
• . . is the stereotypical situation in which relief under § 1983 is
authorized. "132 Since petitioners in this case were not seeking to
avoid pending or ongoing state proceedings of a judicial or administrative nature, requiring exhaustion on the basis of a comity argument
seems an untenable position. 133
Although Preiser represents something of a step backward, some
consolation can be derived from the fact that earlier cases which
delineated a no-exhaustion rule were explicitly reaffirmed. 134 Thus,
the state prisoner's ability to challenge conditions of confinement by
way of either habeas corpus or section 1983 remainis, for th mos,,t
3 5
part, undisturbed. '
129

The state and federal courts may very well be confronted with the same fact

pattern, increasing both courts' dockets and doing harm to the concept of federal-state
comity. Comment, 9 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615, 625 (1974).
l3 See S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); Comment, supra note 93, at 1393. See generally Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949).
131 411 U.S. at 491.
132 Id. at 522 (Brennan J., dissenting).
133 Thus, the considerations that prompted the Supreme Court's holding in Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603-04, 609 (1975), which required the plaintiff to exhaust
state appellate remedies, and dicta in Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1973),
relating to ongoing state administrative proceedings, were not present in this case.
134 411 U.S. at 498-99.
135 It has been suggested that challenges to transfers and to solitary confinement
may well find themselves within the " 'core of habeas corpus.' " Flannery, supra note
100, at 123. However, the recent case of Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd mem., 412 U.S. 914 (1973), indicates that at least transfers do not fall within
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CONSEQUENCES OF THE No-EXHAUSTION RULE IN STATE
PRISONER CASES CHALLENGING CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

The expanded scope of state prisoner litigation brought about by

the availability of the section 1983 remedy and its no-exhaustion
corollary has produced serious consequences. Quantitatively, there
has been a significant increase in petitions alleging violations of pris-

oners' civil rights. Other consequences of the greater availability of
judicial relief, more difficult to demonstrate concretely but serious
nonetheless, include the impact of federal litigation on the administration of state prisons and the disparate treatment accorded to state
and federal prisoners.
Unquestionably, the most dramatic impact of the no-exhaustion
rule in section 1983 actions brought by state prisoners has been on
the dockets of the federal courts. Subsequent to the Monroe decision,
the number of civil rights petitions steadily increased. In 1966, the
first year in which state prisoner actions brought under the civil
rights act were separately categorized, the number of petitions filed
was 233.136 By 1974, the number had increased to over 5,000 petitions, greater than five percent of the total civil cases docketed in the
federal district courts. 13 7 The 1973 decision in Preiser v. Rodriguez,
requiring exhaustion when a state prisoner sought restoration of
good-time credits, 13 8 apparently had little effect on the volume of
section 1983 petitions since the number of petitions filed in 1974 in39
creased by more than twenty-five percent over the previous year.'
Obviously, a reform which would effectuate a substantial reduction
in the number of petitions challenging the conditions of confinement
the core. 341 F. Supp. at 328-29. Moreover, a challenge to solitary confinement is more
akin to a challenge to conditions than it is to the fact or duration of confinement, the
nub of the Preiser rationale. Since the prisoner is not seeking release from custody, he
should not be required to exhaust. Note also that by the simple addition of a valid
damage claim, the Preiser rule can be avoided altogether. See Zagaris, supra note 91, at
831.
136 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

1971 ANN. REP. 132 [hereinafter cited as 1971 REPORT].
137 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

1974 ANN. REP. 110-11, 220 [hereinafter cited as 1974 REPORT].
138 See notes 120-35 supra and accompanying text.
139 1974 REPORT, supra note 137, at 220. The number of section 1983 petitions has
consistently risen from one year to the next. In 1971, the number filed was 3,129. 1971
REPORT, supra note 136, at 132. In 1972, the year after Wilwording v. Swenson, 404
U.S. 249 (1971), was decided, there was a 15 percent increase in state prisoner civil
rights petitions. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS, 1972 ANN. REP. 116. And 1973 produced almost a 25 percent increase from the
previous year. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS, 1973 ANN. REP. 129.
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would ease the pressure of the flood of litigation which is overwhelm40
ing the courts.1
Exacerbating the problem of the crowded dockets are considerations of the time consumed in disposing of complaints. Under the
liberal policy of the courts, pro se complaints of state prisoners which
do not appear to state specific facts sufficient to support their civil
rights claims may not be simply dismissed. Rather, the courts must
determine whether "it appears 'beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim.' -141 This determination
may require evidentiary hearings, consuming as much as several days
of a court's time. 142 Moreover, the courts are obligated to afford the
prisoner-plaintiff sufficient opportunity to amend his complaint for the
140 Commentators and jurists alike have expressed concern regarding the increasingly burdensome caseload. See, e.g., McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1193-94 (D.
Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975); Aldisert,
Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section
1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAW & Soc. ORDER 557, 558-59.
Chief Justice Burger has repeatedly expressed his concern over the swelling docket
and the increase in prisoner cases. See Burger, Chief Justice Burger Issues Yearend Report, 62 A.B.A.J. 189, 190 (1976); Burger, Report on the FederalJudicial Branch-1973,
59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126-28 (1973).
For a discussion of the expansion of the federal courts' jurisdiction and the concomitant caseload problem see McCormack, The Expansion of Federal Question Jurisdiction and the Prisoner Complaint Caseload, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 523, 524-30. But see
Bailey, The Realities of Prisoners' Cases under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983: A Statistical
Survey in the Northern District of Illinois, 6 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 527, 544-45 (1975).
This commentator suggests that the problem of the burdensome caseload is largely illusory. A survey of the Northern District of Illinois revealed that a large percentage of
the section 1983 petitions "were decided on the basis of the inmates' pleadings alone."
The cases did not demand a great amount of judicial time since "most were limited to
acknowledgement of filing the complaint, service of process and dismissal." Id.
141 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (quoting from Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Section 1915 of title 28 of the United States Code permits prisoners to bring actions
in forma pauperis, but section 1915(d) gives the federal court discretion to dismiss an
action which is "frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a), (d) (1970). Citing the
increasing burden which pro se prisoner litigation has imposed upon the federal
judiciary, the Fifth Circuit has sanctioned the use of a form questionnaire to be answered by prisoner-litigants to aid the court in assessing the "frivolity" of the complaint
once docketed. Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976). Significantly, the
approved questionnaire asks whether or not the prisoner has "present[ed] the facts relating to [the] complaint in the state prisoner grievance procedure" if one exists in the
institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated. Id. at 895.
142 See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357
(4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975). McCray illustrates the problem of permitting evidentiary hearings in state prisoners' civil rights cases. McCray, the state prisoner, had instituted fourteen separate section 1983 actions in 1972. Chief Judge Northrop calculated that it could take 42 days to dispose of McCray's suits. 367 F. Supp. at
1195.
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purpose of more clearly establishing the operative facts from which

the civil rights violation arises. 1 43 This policy necessarily results in
further delay.
Security and transportation factors further complicate the hearing
of prisoner cases. The prisoner-plaintiff must be escorted to and from
the courthouse, and security personnel must be present to assure
order in the courtroom.'4 Furthermore, "[t]he required witnesses
are often other inmates who must be transported to the court, creating both [additional] financial costs" and adding to the security
problem. 145
Another major consequence of the no-exhaustion rule is its potential for disrupting the states' administration of correctional institutions. First, correctional personnel are personally subject to money
judgments under section 1983 claims. 146 Such liability may discourage
qualified personnel from entering the field or may so intimidate correctional staff members who are presently employed that they may
discharge their responsibilities less efficiently., or even abandon their
positions entirely. 14 7 Second, the state may be less likely to reform its
own institutions and procedures. Since a prisoner may circumvent
state agencies by bringing a section 1983 action, corrections personnel
may not become aware of, and hence may not be able to rectify,
148
administrative deficiencies until federal litigation is commenced.
143 See Keeton v. Procunier, 468 F.2d 810, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1972); Kauffman v.
Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1276 (3d Cir. 1970).
144 See, e.g., McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516
F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975). The court also pointed out that
additional sums must be expended for transportation of the prisoner. 367 F. Supp. at
1196. Cf. Hirschkop, Crisman & Millemann, Litigating an Affirmative Prisoners' Rights
Action, in PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 255, 268 (M. Herman & M. Haft eds. 1973).
145 Remington, State Prisoner Litigation and the Federal Courts, 1974 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 549, 552.
146 See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 816
(1971). In Roberts, the superintendent of a county farm for prisoners was held liable to
an inmate for $85,000 in damages. The inmate, who was injured by the accidental discharge of a shotgun, brought a section 1983 action, alleging an eighth amendment violation. 456 F.2d at 821. The court of appeals remanded because the severity of the injuries sustained gave rise to elements of damage other than the loss of future earnings
which had served as the sole basis for the trial judge's award. Id. at 833.
147 See Aldisert, supra note 140, at 566.
148 Rather than have state policymakers determine the appropriate reform, the federal judiciary interposes its own judgment. Id. at 563. Although this might benefit the
individual prisoner bringing the action, problems affecting the entire prison population
may remain unresolved since considerations "of federalism and comity . . . usually reduce the willingness of federal judges to grant wide-sweeping relief." Hirschkop, Crisman & Millemann, supra note 144, at 261 (footnote omitted).
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Furthermore, state officials are in a position to shift responsibility to
the federal courts instead of making difficult and, perhaps, costly decisions which might be unpopular with tax-paying voters. 149 Third,
during the course of litigation, administrators and other corrections
personnel may be called as witnesses or be named as parties to the
proceedings.150 As a consequence, these individuals are diverted from
their managerial and supervisory functions. The result is a less efficient institutional operation.
Finally, the no-exhaustion rule in section 1983 actions brought
by state prisoners has created an anomaly with respect to the treatment of complaints brought by federal prisoners alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Those convicted under federal law
are not eligible to bring an action under section 1983151 and are
required to exhaust administrative remedies before commencing
litigation.1 52 This distinction in the application of the exhaustion rule
cannot be justified on the basis of a prisoner's having been convicted
under federal law. The governmental entity has the same legal relationship to the individual whether the individual is convicted under
state or federal law.
The problems created by the prevailing no-exhaustion rule have
prompted varying responses. Most notable has been the implementation by several states of inmate grievance mechanisms which present
prisoners with an alternative to litigation. Whether these existing
procedures are a viable substitute for federal court intervention and
whether state prisoners should be required to exhaust these remedies
prior to instituting a section 1983 action are the issues that have attracted the attention of the courts.
Aldisert, supra note 140, at 562.
See Hellerstein & Shapiro, Crisis Litigation: Problems and Suggestions, in
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 287, 293-94, 299-300 (M. Herman & M. Haft eds.
1973).
151 A federal prisoner does not have a cause of action against federal corrections
officials under section 1983 since that statute creates a remedy for conduct committed
under color of state law. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 423-25 (1973);
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
Alternatively, federal prisoners may seek relief from allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement by way of mandamus, see note 91 supra, or by seeking equitable
intervention pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. Damages for physical injury resulting
from the negligence of a federal employee may be awarded to a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq. (1970). See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S.
150, 150 (1963). Federal prisoners' remedy for work-related injuries is 18 U.S.C. § 4126
(1970), which provides a form of workmen's compensation for the convict.
152 See, e.g., Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Conn. 1972); cf. Beale v.
Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1139 (5th Cir. 1972).
149
150
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INMATE GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS AND THE No-EXHAUSTION
RULE: IS THE PROTECTION AFFORDED PRISONERS'
RIGHTS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE IMPOSITION
OF AN EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT?

McCray v. Burrell
The recognition of prisoners' rights and the increase in litigation
by prisoners to protect these rights have not gone unnoticed by the
states. State governments and individual correctional institutions have
responded to the need for a means by which prisoners may redress
grievances. 15 3 The movement on the part of the states to set their
own correctional institutions in order has in turn prompted a reevaluation of the prevailing no-exhaustion view by the federal courts.
In McCray v. Burrell,15 4 the district court was faced with the
issue of whether the prisoner-petitioner should have exhausted the
available administrative remedy through the state Inmate Grievance
Commission prior to commencing a section 1983 action. 15 5 In view of
the practical consequences of the no-exhaustion rule, the district
court found to be "compelling" an interpretation of the Supreme
Court cases which required exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies by prisoners.156 It concluded that exhaustion should be
required in this case if the remedy were adequate. 157
The court, in an effort to determine the adequacy of the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission remedy, applied a three-part test
which examined the theoretical due process adequacy of the remedy,
the practical adequacy of the remedy, and the extent of the state's
interest in the matter. 158 The first element of the test involved an
153 A survey of 209 institutions, holding approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of
the male inmates and nearly all of the female inmates under state jurisdictions, showed
that 77% of the institutions had what they considered a formal grievance procedure.
McArthur, Inmate Grievance Mechanisms: A Survey of 209 American Prisons, 38 FED.
PROB., Dec. 1974, at 41-43. About one-half of the grievance procedures had been implemented between mid-1971 and 1973. Id. at 42.
1-4 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 264 (1975).
155 367 F. Supp. at 1193.
I" Id. at 1199. The court adopted the interpretation given to Wilwording and its
predecessors by Judge Newman in Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1972).
The position was essentially that the Supreme Court cases had held that neither state
judicial remedies nor inadequate administrative remedies need be exhausted. Id. at
959-60. The question of whether an adequate state administrative remedy should be
pursued by a state prisoner prior to federal judicial action had never been determined.
Id. at 960. Of course, Kochie involved complaints filed by federal prisoners and Judge
Newman's remarks must be considered in that context. Id. at 957.
157 367 F. Supp. at 1199.
158 Id. at 1201. The test applied by the McCray court was formulated in Armsden v.
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examination of the statute creating the Commission. 159 Under the
legislation, the Commission is composed of five members, at least two
of whom must be attorneys and at least two of whom must have some
expertise in correctional services. All members are appointed by the
Governor.1 60 The Commission has original jurisdiction to hear all inmate complaints "against any officials or employees of the Division of
Correction," unless the individual institution has a "reasonable and
1 61
fair" grievance procedure which the inmate is required to exhaust.
Upon receipt of a grievance from an inmate, the Commission may
16 2
dismiss the complaint if it is wholly without merit on its face.
When a complaint is determined to be meritorious, however, a hearing is scheduled as "promptly as practicable.' ' 1 63 The statute provides
the inmate with the right to appear before the Commission, the right
to present a reasonable number of witnesses subject to the Commission's discretion, and a reasonable opportunity for cross-examination. 164 The inmate may be represented by counsel at his own
expense, 1 6 5 and the hearings are recorded. 1 66 The Commission has
access, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Safety and
Cataldo, 315 F. Supp. 129 (D. Mass. 1970). In Armsden, the court did not cite any
authorities for the standard imposed to determine adequacy and relied upon the
rationale stated in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), for the imposition of
an exhaustion requirement. 315 F. Supp. at 131-32. For a discussion of the Eisen case
see note 56 supra.
The McCray test has been criticized on two grounds. First, it has been said that the
court's assumption that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment applied
was unfounded since the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission could not deprive an
inmate of any constitutionally protected interest. Comment, The Maryland Inmate
Grievance Commission or the Federal Courts? A Problem of Exhaustion, 35 MD. L.
REV. 458, 474 (1976). On the other hand, ifthe procedure is to act as ati alternative to
federal court intervention pursuant to section 1983, the Commission will frequently
make decisions on matters which affect the constitutionally protected interests of prisoners. Under such circumstances, where the Commission may render a decision adverse
to the prisoner, it is arguable that due process is applicable since a grievous loss may
result.
The second criticism of the McCray test concerned the "extent of the state's interest in the subject matter of the litigation." Id. This consideration, however, has been
deemed irrelevant to a determination of the remedy's adequacy. Its significance lies in
the determination of whether exhaustion should be imposed. Id.
159367 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
160 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(a) (Supp. 1975). The Governor, in making the
appointments, is required to seek the advice of the Secretary of the Department of
Public Safety and Corrections. Id.
161 Id. § 204F(d).
162 Id. § 204F(e).
163Id. § 204F(f).
166 Id. § 204F(h).
165Id.
I- Id. § 204F(i).
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Correctional Services, to any documentary evidence relating to the
matter and may administer oaths. 1 6 7 Decisions of the Commission
against the inmate are final for the purpose of judicial review, but a
decision in the inmate's favor must be approved by the Secretary,
who may also modify or reverse a decision of the Commission.' 6 8
The McCray court examined both the theoretical adequacy and
the practical workings of the Commission. 169 It found that those who
had been appointed to the Commission were individuals "equipped
with the perspicacity to make objective judgments.' 170 The Commission's jurisdiction to hear grievances was found to mirror that of a
federal court in section 1983 prisoner cases, and it was authorized to
grant relief analogous to the equity relief available from the judiciary. 1 7 1 Of 923 complaints filed with the Commission at the time of
the litigation, 507 were dismissed administratively, hearings were
held on 318, and 103 had dispositions favoring the inmate, at least in
part. 172 On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the
73
remedy was adequate both in practice and theory.1
Turning next to the state's interest in the subject matter of
prisoner litigation, the court found the state's interest to be "paramount.' ' 174 Because the state had instituted a "complete, self-contained and self-executing administrative process . . . to resolve
prisoner complaints," the district court concluded that federal intervention was simply not justified. 1 75 The court noted that a monetary award, which might be forthcoming in a section 1983 action,
would merely be postponed as a result of its decision. 176 No prejudice would result from requiring exhaustion since "there is no sense
17 7
of immediacy attendant upon the awarding of money damages.'
167 Id. § 204F(g). The Commission also may "subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all documentary evidence of any person relating
to any matter under investigation." Id.
6s Id. § § 20417(f)(1), (2).
19 367 F. Supp. at 1202-04.
170 Id. at 1202.

171 Id. at 1202, 1208.
172 Id. at 1203.
173 Id. at 1209.
174 Id. at 1205.
175 Id.

176 Id. at 1208. The Commission had reimbursed prisoners for loss of or damage to
property but was advised by the Maryland Attorney General that it did not have the
authority to do so. This matter is being litigated in the state courts. Comment, supra
note 158, at 481.
17' 367 F. Supp. at 1209. In Washington v. Boslow, 375 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Md.
1974), rev'd sub nom. McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
264 (1975), the same district court applied the exhaustion rule fashioned in McCray,
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Thus, based on its findings that the mechanism provided a prompt,
fair, and effective means for challenging prison conditions, the court
78
held that the petitioners should be required to exhaust. 1
The district court opinion was subsequently reversed by the
Fourth Circuit 179 on the basis of repeated Supreme Court expressions
of a no-exhaustion rule.18 0 Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court.' 8 ' The matter presents two problems for resolution:
Should state prisoners be required to exhaust state administrative
remedies prior to assertion of jurisdiction in a section 1983 action
which challenges conditions of confinement; if so, does the Maryland
Inmate Grievance Commission provide an adequate remedy?
In deciding whether to opt for an exhaustion requirement, the
Court must consider whether the practical consequences of a noexhaustion rule are sufficiently compelling to justify reversal of its
earlier opinion in Houghton v. Shafer, 1 82 where the no-exhaustion
83
standard of Monroe and McNeese was applied to state prisoners.1
The Court should be mindful that the imposition of an exhaustion
requirement in McCray may be interpreted by lower courts to portend a general narrowing process of the jurisdictional scope of section
1983. Thus, to the extent the Court wishes to avoid a misapplication
of a new exhaustion rule in civil rights cases, it should explicitly reaffirm the "supplementary" aspect of the section 1983 remedy for all
non-prisoner cases.
The Court is also presented with the opportunity to clarify the
rule laid down in Preiser v. Rodriguez,18 4 which held that a state
prisoner seeking injunctive relief in a federal court for the restoration
of good-time credits has as his exclusive remedy habeas corpus, with
its consequent exhaustion requirement; but where he seeks damages,
that claim may go forward without exhaustion.18 5 In McCray, the disdespite the plaintiff's assertion that the Commission's lack of authority to grant damages
rendered the procedure ineffective. 375 F. Supp. at 1299-1300. The court justified its
holding of adequacy on the ground that once informed of the condition which gave rise
to the grievance, prison authorities could take corrective action to prevent its recurrence. Therefore, exhaustion would result in a more "expeditious resolution" in a subsequent judicial proceeding because the issues would be more easily discernible from
the record of the administrative proceedings. Id. at 1300.
178 367 F. Supp. at 1209-10.
179 McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 371 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264
(1975).
180 516 F.2d at 361-65.
181 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975).

392 U.S. 639, 640-41 (1968).
183See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text.

182

1- 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
185 Id. at 494, 500.
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trict court stated that the damage claim must be held in abeyance
until such time as state administrative remedies are exhausted. 18 6 In
light of the recent affirmance of the Preiser no-exhaustion rule for
damage claims in Wolff v. McDonnell,18 7 the district court might very
well be overruled on this point. It would appear that, at least where
damages are sought in a section 1983 action, no-exhaustion is, and
will remain, the controlling rule.
If an exhaustion rule is formulated, several factors may be of significance in determining whether the available remedy is adequate.
Similar to other existing state grievance mechanisms, 8 8 the Maryland
Inmate Grievance Commission has only the power to make rulings
which are subject to approval by the state official in charge of the
corrections department. 189 The Commission itself can grant no remedy to the inmate but must await an order from the Secretary of the
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. 190 Thus,
there is at least some doubt as to whether the Commission is able to
grant effective relief, and this may be a sufficient ground for a finding
of inadequacy. ' 9'
A second factor, institutional bias, also arises from the Secretary's
control over the procedure and may bear on a finding of adequacy.
Where a grievance arises as a result of the Department's regulations,
the Secretary ultimately determines whether the grievance has
merit. 192 To a certain extent, therefore, there may exist a prejudgment on the issue by the Secretary which, in itself, may be sufficient
93
grounds for a finding of inadequacy.1
Three Supreme Court decisions, in which state prisoners challenged administrative proceedings outside the grievance process, may
186 367 F. Supp. at 1210.
187 418

U.S. at 539, 554-55 (1974).

188 See notes 263-64 infra and accompanying text.
'89 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(f)(2) (Supp. 1975).

190 Id.
191In McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963), the Court found that an
administrative process which could only " 'investigate, recommend and report' " and
had "no power to order corrective action," provided only "tenuous protection" of federal rights and did not have to be exhausted. Id. at 675-76 (quoting from United States
Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 210 (1945)).
192 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(f)(2) (Supp. 1975).
193See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). In Gibson, the district
court found the available state administrative remedy inadequate because evidence
suggested two sources of bias: There was an indication that the tribunal had a preconceived opinion on the matter, and members of the tribunal would gain financially as a
result of a decision against the plaintiffs. Berryhill v. Gibson, 331 F. Supp. 122, 126
(M.D. Ala. 1971). However, the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to reach the issue
of possible prejudgment since the finding of personal interest was sufficient to render
the remedy inadequate. 411 U.S. at 578-79.
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provide some guidance in determining whether the Secretary's ultimate authority renders the procedure inadequate. In Morrissey v.
Brewer, 19 4 the prisoner-petitioner challenged the revocation of his
parole on due process grounds. 195 In holding that the petitioner
should have been afforded certain procedural protections, 196 the
Court concluded that due process required that an independent
decisionmaker, even someone else from the same department, should
have examined the facts to determine if a "reasonable ground" existed to believe that the conditions of parole had been violated. 19 7 In
a case decided shortly thereafter, Gagnon v. Scarpelli,198 the Court
held that probation revocation must be preceded by a hearing under
the conditions specified in Morrissey,199 which would require the
hearing to be conducted by an independent decisionmaker. Most
recently, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 20 0 it was held that a tribunal composed of high-level institutional officials, which determined whether
a state prisoner should be subject to a loss of good-time credits for
violating disciplinary rules, did not present "such a hazard of arbitrary
decisionmaking" as to be "violative of due process of law."201
In each case, the Court first determined whether due process
was applicable and then considered what process was due by applying an interest-balancing test.2 0 2 The Court found that parole, proba194408

U.S. at 471 (1972).
195 Id. at 474. The case before the Supreme Court was a consolidation of two petitions of habeas corpus filed by separate prisoners in the district court. Id.
196

Id. at 482.

197Id. at 485-86. The Court described this initial process as a preliminary hearing
which should be cond,,cted "at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest." Id. at 485.
198411 U.S. 778 (1973).
199 Id.
at 782.
200
201

418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Id. at 570-71.

202 Id.
at 557-72; 411 U.S. at 781-88; 408 U.S. at 481-90. The due process analysis
used by the Court in Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff is a two-step process adopted from a
line of cases concerning property interests. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Due
Process-Right to Due Process at Probation Revocation-Indigent's Right to Appointed
Counsel at Probation Revocation in Appropriate Cases, 23 EMORY L.J. 617, 631 & n.
109 (1974). First, an inquiry must be made into the nature of the interest deprived,
which determines the applicability of due process protections. Second, the competing
interests, including the state's, must be weighed to determine what procedures are
mandated. Id. It has been suggested that considerations of the gravity of the deprivation
in determining what process is due requires the establishment of a priority schedule for
"the relative severity of different deprivations" which will entail a great expenditure of
judicial time. See Note, The Fourteenth Amendment and Prisons: A New Look at Due
Processfor Prisoners, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1281 (1975).
The Court in Morrissey suggested that the nature of the interest-whether it is
"within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth
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tion, and good-time credits were state-created liberty interests within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment which, if taken from the
prisoner, subjected him to a " 'grievous loss.' " 20 3 The conclusion derived from this analysis was that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment demanded that procedural safeguards be adhered
to in any proceeding which could result in a deprivation of one of
20 4
these interests.
In determining what safeguards were mandated, the Court
looked to the nature of the interests involved. In Morrissey, the
Court found the state to have an "overwhelning interest" in imprisoning a parolee, "without the burden of a new adversary criminal
trial," once the parolee had violated the terms of his conditional
freedom. 20 5 However, society was also found to have an interest in
treating the prisoner with "basic fairness" which would foster the
prospects of rehabilitation. 20 6 Thus, the Morrissey Court required
that (1) a " 'neutral and detached' " body make the determination on
revocation; (2) that the individual receive written notice of the charge;
(3) that the evidence against the parolee or probationer be disclosed;
Amendment--is of greater significance than the gravity of the deprivation in determining whether due process applies at all. 408 U.S. at 481. However, the Court's conclusion
that orderly process should be imposed was-seemingly based on a finding that the termination of parole inflicted a grievous loss of conditional liberty interests. Id. at 482.
Thus, the weight of the interest appears to be of continuing importance in the initial
stages of the due process test.
203 408 U.S. at 482.
204
See 418 U.S. at 557-58; 411 U.S. at 781; 408 U.S. at 481-82.
Prior to Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the question of whether procedural protections were applicable at all depended upon whether the governmental
benefit involved in the case was characterized as a right or as a privilege. If characterized as a privilege, the protections were held not to apply. In Grahan, the rightprivilege distinction was abolished. Id. at 374. Consequently, it opened the door to
successful challenges by prisoners concerning their status either within the prison or
upon conditional release. See Note, An Endorsement of Due Process Reform In Parole
Revocation: Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 LOYOLA U.L.A.L. REV. 157, 170-71 (1973). Whether
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is applicable is now dependent
upon
the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."
• . . The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but
whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (citations omitted) (quoting from Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
205 408 U.S. at 483. Morrissey was distinguishable from Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128 (1967), which held the full panoply of due process rights applicable to a deferred
sentencing and probation revocation proceeding because that proceeding was considered to be a stage of the criminal prosecution. Id. at 135-37. See 408 U.S. at 475.
206

408 U.S. at 484.
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(4) that the individual be afforded the right to be heard and present
testimonial and documentary evidence; (5) that the individual have
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless "good
cause" were found for not allowing cross-examination; and (6) that a
written statement containing the reasons for the decision be prepared
20 7
by the hearing tribunal.
Not all these safeguards were found to be applicable to disciplinary proceedings. In Wolff, the Court found that adversary proceedings could increase tensions that already existed between prisoner
and jailer, and that there was a "necessity to maintain an acceptable
level of personal security." 20 8 As a consequence of these considerations, which were attributable to the prison setting in which the hearings were held, the Court held that prisoners did not have the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, that they had only a limited right to call witnesses and present evidence, that they must be
given written notice of the proceedings, that the factfinders must
prepare a written statement of the reasons for their decision, and that
the tribunal composed of high-level institutional officials was sufficiently independent to satisfy due process.209
In McCray, the Court is not faced with the countervailing considerations present in Morrissey, Gagnon, and Wolff which justified
the minimal safeguards imposed. The prisoners in the latter cases had
demonstrated behavior which could have necessitated either reincarceration or a more strict regime for the prisoner already incarcerated. 2 10 In the context of the McCray controversy, it is the state,
207

Id. at 484-89. These were the procedures mandated at the final revocation

hearing for either a parolee or pioboationer wvhcre a decision woudd he made on rein-

carceration. Where the probationer or parolee denies that he has committed the alleged
violations, or admits that he committed the acts but "there are substantial reasons which
justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate," the right to
counsel has been mandated. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
The Morrissey decision imposed a bifurcated process for parole revocation which
Gagnon adopted for probation revocation as well. The initial stage is a preliminary hearing at which a factual determination is made about the alleged violation of the conditions of parole or probation. 408 U.S. at 479-80.
The decisions in Morrissey and Gagnon created some problems for the states in the
implementation of administrative procedures which complied with the judicial guidelines. See, e.g., Cassou, The Morrissey Maelstrom: Recent Developments in California
Parole and Probation Revocation, 9 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 43, 49 (1974); Comment, Scarpelli: A Mandate for Change of the Due Process of Law Requirements in
Texas Probation Revocation Hearings, 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 895, 921-23 (1974).
208 418 U.S. at 563.
209 Id.

at 564, 566-71.
210 As the Court indicated in Morrissey, there is an element of risk involved in the

early release of the parolee in that he may "not be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts." 408 U.S. at 483. Clearly, this risk factor holds just as
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through its agents who have allegedly engaged in the unlawful or
wrongful conduct, which has deprived the prisoner of rights that are
constitutionally protected. 2 11 If a new exhaustion rule is adopted,
which would temporarily close the door to the federal courts, then
additional procedures should be imposed upon the grievance commission to assure that decisions will be made in a manner that sufficiently protects prisoner interests. First, the Commission's final
decision should not be subject to reversal or modification by the Secretary of the Department. This serves the dual purpose of rendering
the remedy more effective and diminishing institutional bias. Second,
the inmate should have the option of being represented either by an
employee of the department2 12 or a fellow inmate at no expense, in
addition to his existing right to be represented by counsel at his own
expense. Third, written findings of fact and conclusions of law should
be required for all cases. A record should be kept in the event that a
prisoner, dissatisfied with the informal dispositions and having no
further recourse through the administrative process, chooses to pursue the matter in the courts. 213 Such a record would provide the
true for the probationer who has been convicted but who is not incarcerated.
The imposition of even fewer safeguards in Wolff was justified on "the very different stake the State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing."
418 U.S. at 561. The Court, describing the position of the state, explained that
[t]he reality is that disciplinary hearings and the imposition of disagreeable
sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between inmates and authority and
between inmates who are being disciplined and those who would charge or
furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing reasonable personal
safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of
disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of personal antagonisms
on the important aims of the correctional process.

Id. at 562.
211 The court of appeals in McCray found sevoral grounds for liability. In the
petitioner's suit against Burrell, the captain of the guards, the condition of the
petitioner's two-day confinement in a mental observation cell was found to constitute a
per se violation of the eighth amendment. 516 F.2d at 369. The prisoner, completely
stripped of clothing, was "in a barren cell without blanket or mattress and with nowhere
to sit." McCray "had no sink or running water; his only toilet was a hole in the floor,
the cover of which was encrusted with human excrement." id.
The court of appeals found a second eighth amendment violation in McCray's case
against Burrell and Officer Smith, a guard, because each had failed to comply with
institutional directives requiring immediate contact with a psychiatrist or psychologist
after an inmate had been placed in isolation for demonstrating irrational behavior. Smith
failed to seek professional help for McCray until twenty-four hours had passed, and
Burrell, as a captain, should have used means "other than continu[ing] isolation" when
professional help was not forthcoming. Id. at 368-69.
212 This right is presently incorporated in the North Carolina Inmate Grievance
Commission proceedings. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-109 (Supp. 1975).
213 Since many complaints are dismissed during informal review, there is inade-
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courts with a basis for making a preliminary determination of whether
the grievance has merit. 2 14 With these added procedures, the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission could be considered an adequate
substitute for federal court intervention pursuant to section 1983.
Methods of Hearing Inmate Grievances-OtherStates' Responses
The Inmate Grievance Commission implemented by the State of
Maryland represents merely one type of process for the redress of
prisoner grievances. The past several years have seen an expansion
2 15
of institutional procedures for handling "inmate complaints.Nevertheless, relatively few states have passed legislation creating
statewide uniform systems for redressing grievances.2 16 Mechanisms
created by statute are usually multi-level processes which culminate
with an appeal to a commission similar to that of the Maryland system. Other states have recently enacted legislation creating ombudsman programs for the purpose of investigating citizens' or prisoners'
complaints. A third type of mechanism, usually created by administrative action, is the inmate council. Analysis of the three approaches
indicates that the procedure adopted by Maryland may, with modification, provide an administrative remedy which the courts will find
"exhaustible," and which will best function as a substitute for section
1983 in protecting prisoners' rights.
Several states have opted for an ombudsman program which is
loosely based on the Scandinavian prototype. 2 17 In Minnesota and
quate record for later perusal by a court. See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1203
(D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975).
214
Cf. note 25 supra.
215 About one-half of all existing grievance procedures and ombudsman programs
have been started within the last several years. McArthur, supra note 153, at 42.
One hundred sixty of the institutions surveyed claimed to have grievance procedures, most of which had been implemented at the institutional or departmental
level. Id. at 43.
216 Only two states in addition to Maryland have enacted legislation which authorizes the creation of a formal grievance procedure and contains specific guidelines
delineating the general operation of the procedure. See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 139 (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
The state of New Jersey has recently enacted legislation setting up an Office of
Inmate Advocacy to protect the class interests of prisoners. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27E-10
to -12 (Supp. 1975-76). The Office is charged with the responsibility of representing
inmates' interests in "disputes and litigation," including their interest in departmental
affairs. Id. § 42:27E-12. However, there is no formal procedure for the handling of
individual prisoner complaints.
217 Charles XII of Sweden was probably the creator of ombudsmen in 1713. W.
GELLHORN, OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS 194 (1966). However, it has been said that interest in the ombudsman concept did not develop until Denmark instituted its program in
1955. Id. at 5. The duties of the office of the ombudsman in the Scandinavian countries
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Iowa, the office of the ombudsman has been established independent
of any administrative agency. 2 18 The Governor of Minnesota selects
the ombudsman, 21 9 while in Iowa he is selected by a legislative council, subject to approval and confirmation by the legislature. 22 0 In each
state, the ombudsman performs the service of reviewing administrative action, either in response to individual complaints or as a
result of his own initiative.2 2 1 His investigatory powers are broad:
He has access to the documents of all agencies, may initiate hearings on matters, and may compel testimony. 22 2 His conclusions
are in the form of recommendations submitted either to the appropriate state agency or to the legislature.2 2 3 Although the ombudsman
can provide an important service, the program contains none of the
procedural safeguards, such as a complainant's right to an evidentiary
hearing, which courts normally associate with exhaustible administrative remedies. Furthermore, a complainant is often required to exhaust other available administrative remedies before the ombudsman
22 4
will act on his complaint.
are to inspect and supervise governmental establishments within its delegated subjectmatter jurisdiction and to respond to problems, either individual or public in nature,
arising from the operation of government. Id. at 426-27. The ombudsman has some investigatory powers including access to files and the summoning of individuals for discussion. Id. at 431-32. After investigation, the ombudsman meets with those high-level
officials whose departments are involved and attempts to negotiate a resolution of the
problem or submits proposals for legislative reform where appropriate. The process
usually culminates with the public issuance of an explanatory opinion. Id. at 433-36.
Normally, the ombudsman's opinion is merely a recommendation, but since he is considered to be independent of the machinery investigated, his opinions are readily
accepted.
Id. at 436-37.
218
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.9 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.41 et seq.
(Supp. 1975). In Minnesota, the ombudsman's office was created specifically for the
purpose of reviewing actions of the Department of Corrections, and his jurisdiction is so
limited. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.41 (Supp. 1975). New Jersey has also instituted an
ombudsman program by departmental action within its Department of Institutions and
Agencies (I & A). However, the independence of the position may be perceived by
inmates as compromised since "[tihe Office .. .is primarily designed to serve the needs
of the Commissioner of I & A." Bershad & Singer, The Law of Corrections in the State
of New Jersey: Analysis of Statutory and Case Law Limitations upon the Scope of Authority of the Division of Correction and Parole H-2, Sept. 10, 1975 (on file at the Seton
Hall Law Review).
219 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.41 (Supp. 1975).
220 IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.3 (Supp. 1975).
221 Id. § 601G.9(1) (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.44(1)(d) (Supp. 1975).
222 IOWA CODE ANN. § 601G.9 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.44(1) (Supp.
1975).
223IOWA CODE ANN.

§ 601G.16 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 241.44(4), (5)(c)

(Supp. 1975).
224
See IOWA CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1975).

§

601G.12 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§

241.44(3)
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A second approach to handling inmate grievances, implemented
at the institutional level, is the inmate council, a group composed
primarily of representatives of the prison population. 225 Usually, the
councils serve "as sounding boards for the administration," discussing
and advocating changes in existing regulations and policies and formulating recommendations which are presented to the administration. 22 6 In attempting to avoid council meetings degenerating into
"personal interest forums,"227 the majority of the inmate
councils do
not handle individual complaints. As such, they should not be viewed
as an exhaustible remedy.
The mechanism that has been judicially recognized as providing
an adequate remedy which must be exhausted befbre initiation of a
section 1983 action is the inmate grievance procedure. 228 The procedure is usually a multi-level system that involves review by a commission which often includes individuals from outside the correctional
institution. Illinois, Wisconsin, and North Carolina, as well as Maryland, have instituted programs that have received favorable responses
from the courts and commentators. 229 New York is presently implementing a similar multi-level mechanism under recent legislation. 2 30
Each system provides that an inmate-grievant first seek relief at
the institutional level. 23 1 In Illinois, an inquiry board composed of
correctional staff members designated by a Chief Administrative Officer meets weekly to resolve complaints of inmates. 232 The inquiry
225

See

JUSTICE:

CENTER FOR CORRECTIONAL
GRIEVANCE

MECHANISMS

IN

JUSTICE, TOWARD A GREATER

MEASURE OF

CORRECTIONAL

68-69 (1975)

INSTITUTIONS

[hereinafter cited as C.C.J.].
226 Id. at 69.
227 Id. at 70-71.
228

See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1210 (D. Md. 1973), rev'd, 516 F.2d
357 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 264 (1975).
229 The Center for Correctional Justice suggests that Maryland, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Illinois each present a promising prospect for successful administration
since they contain " 'external' elements," i.e., persons from outside the institution participate in the procedure to review inmate grievances. C.C.J., supra note 225, at 58-59.
The Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission was considered a prompt effective
vehicle for prisoner grievances in McCray. 367 F. Supp. at 1209. It has been suggested
that the Maryland and North Carolina commissions should be considered by other states
when and if they implement inmate grievance procedures. Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Prisoner Petitions-Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies, 28 ARK. L. REV.

479, 489-90 (1975).

230 See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 40 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1975).
231 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(d) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 139

(McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-104 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ADMIN.

REG.

§ 845 (1975); Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Services Division of Corrections,
Inmate Complaint Review Systems 2, Jan. 31, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Review System].
232 ILL. ADMIN. REG. §[ 845(II)(B), (D) (1975).
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board has the right to summon as witnesses any appropriate prisoners
or staff members. The inmate-grievant "must have an opportunity to
appear, '233 but there is no authorization for the presentation of evidence or for cross-examination in either the statutes authorizing the
establishment of the procedures 234 or in the regulations adopted pursuant to the statutes. 2 35 The inquiry board submits its recommendations in a written report to the Chief Administrative Officer within
ten days of receipt of the inmate's complaint. Within five days of
receipt of the board's findings, the Chief Administrative Officer must
advise the inmate in writing of the appropriate actions which are
23 6
contemplated.
Unlike Illinois, the New York statute mandates inmate participation at the individual institution. 2 37 An Inmate Grievance Resolution
Committee (IGRC) is composed of five members, of whom one is a
nonvoting chairman, two are inmates elected by the prisoner population, and two are staff members selected by the superintendent of
the institution. 2 38 The chairman is selected by inmate and staff representatives. 239 Like the Illinois procedure, strict time limits are imposed on the process and, when a matter concerns the policies and
regulations of the institution, the IGRC's power is limited to the
adoption of recommendations, which are forwarded to the superintendent of the institution. 2 40 The mechanism is designed to provide
notice to all parties and witnesses and affords all parties involved the
opportunity to present evidence to the IGRC at the hearings. 24 ' Decisions must be communicated in writing by both the IGRC and the
24 2
institution's superintendent.
Inmate participation is also a feature of the Wisconsin grievance
procedure. However, the Wisconsin version of the IGRC receives the
complaints only after review by the warden who may refer the matter
243
to the inmate-staff grievance committee in his discretion.
In each of the five states, an individual who is unsatisfied with
the result at the institutional level may pursue the matter on appeal.
-a3Id. § 845(11)(E).
234 See ILL. ANN. STAT.

ch. 38, § 1003-8-8 (Smith-Hurd 1973).
§ 845 (1975).

235 See ILL. ADMIN. REG.

Id. §§ 845(II)(F), (G).
237See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 139 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
238 New York Dep't of Correction, Inmate Grievance Program Training Manual 2-3
(1975) [hereinafter cited as New York Training Manual].
236

239 Id. at 3-4.
240 Id. at 9.
241 Id. at 8-9.

242 Id. at 9-11.

243 Wisconsin Review System, supra note 231, at 3.
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In Wisconsin, an aggrieved inmate may seek review by the Corrections Complaint Examiner, a special assistant appointed by the Attorney General, who may conduct hearings. 244 The Examiner has wide
latitude in determining the procedures to be followed in the proceedings, but his determinations are merely recommendations subject to
review by the administrator of the division of corrections. 2 45 If an
inmate is dissatisfied with the decision of the administrator, authority
is vested in the secretary of the state corrections department to review the complaint and make the final decision. 24 6
In New York, Maryland, and North Carolina, final appeal is to a
commission 24 7 which may be composed entirely of individuals from
outside the corrections establishment. 248 The inmate may appeal in
these states as a matter of right. 2 49 In Illinois, final appeal is to a
three-man commission appointed by the director of the corrections
department. Only one member of the commission is required to be
an individual from outside the department. 25 0 The appeal does not lie
as a matter of right; rather it is within the discretion of the director to
25 1
refer the matter to the review board.
The New York Commission of Correction merely reviews the
record as established below. 25 2 Illinois and North Carolina, however,
provide for hearings at the final appeals level. 25 3 In Illinois, the collection of evidence is limited to taking testimony from inmates and
staff witnesses whom the board may call in its discretion. 2 54 No other
procedures for the taking of evidence are specified in the regulations.
North Carolina, whose system is nearly identical to the Maryland In244 Id. at 4. The Department of Health and Social Services is to advise and approve
the appointment. id.
245 Id. The regulations indicate that the Examiner has subpoena power and unlimited access to inmates, staff, and the correctional facility. Id. Representation of the
parties may be permitted, and the Examiner may provide an opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination. Id.
246 Id. at 5-6.
247 MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(f) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 139
(McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-104 (Supp. 1975).
248 In Maryland and North Carolina, the governor appoints the members of the Inmate Grievance Commission. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(a) (Supp. 1975); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 148-101 (Supp. 1975). In New York, the appointments by the governor to
the commission of corrections are made with the advice and consent of the senate. N.Y.
CORREC. LAW § 41 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
249 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(d) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 139(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-104 (Supp. 1975).
250 See ILL. ADMIN. REG. § 845(II)(K) (1975).
251 Id. § 845(J).
252 See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 139(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
253 See N.C. GEN. SWAT. § 148-106 (Supp. 1975); ILL. ADMIN. REG. § 845(L) (1975).
254

See ILL. ADMIN. REG. § 845(L) (1975).
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mate Grievance Commission, provides the inmate with the right to
appear before the Commission, the right to present a reasofnable
number of witnesses subject to the Commission's discretion, and a
reasonable opportunity for cross-examination. 255 The Commission has
access, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Correction to any
documentary evidence relating to the matter and may also administer
oaths. 25 6 Unlike the Maryland procedure which permits retained
counsel at the inmate's expense, 25 7 North Carolina permits representation by an employee of the Department of Correction. 258 A significant provision of the statutes of both North Carolina and Maryland is
the requirement that a record of the proceedings be kept. 259 Both
states also require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to ju26 0
dicial review in the state courts.
In some states, the jurisdiction of the grievance mechanism is
limited. In Wisconsin and New York, review of a disciplinary proceeding is specifically precluded, and the regulations of the New York
Board of Parole are exempt from review as well. 26 1 Otherwise, "any
written or unwritten policy, regulation, or rule" may be challenged in
the New York process.2 6 2 In Illinois, North Carolina, and Wisconsin,
subject-matter jurisdiction is not specifically delineated in the statutes. It is difficult to determine, therefore, whether their procedures,
like Maryland's, mirror the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a section 1983 prisoner action.
In each state, the final order of the reviewing body is subject to
reversal by the head of the department of correction. 2 63 But, in New
York, the discretion of the head of the department is checked by the
rulemaking power of the state Commission of Correction. 264 It is possible, therefore, that where a decision rendered by the Commission
See N.C. GEN.
Id. § 148-108.
257 See MD. ANN.
258 See N.C. GEN.
259 See MD. ANN.
255

STAT. § 148-109 (Supp. 1975).

25

CODE art. 41, § 204F(h) (Supp. 1975).
STAT. § 148-109 (Supp. 1975).
CODE art. 41, § 204F(f) (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.

§ 148-107

(Supp. 1975).
260
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 204F(1) (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-113
(Supp. 1975).
261 New York Training Manual, supra note 238, at 1; Wisconsin Review System,
supra note 231, at 1.
262 New York Training Manual, supra note 238, at 1.
263 See

§

MD. ANN.

CODE art. 41,

§ 204F(f)(2) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CORREC.

LAW

139(3) (McKinney Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-106(2) (Supp. 1975); ILL.
ADMIN. REG. § 845(N) (1975); Wisconsin Review System, supra note 231, at 6.
264 See N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 45(6) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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in favor of the inmate has been reversed by the Commissioner of
Correctional Services, the regulation which caused that grievance
may be amended or repealed.
Like the Maryland Inmate Grievance Commission, each of the
procedures discussed is subject to attack as inadequate. With the possible exception of the New York state Commission of Correction,
each of the mechanisms may be considered unable to grant effective
relief because the conclusions of the administrative body are merely
tentative and subject to the approval of the head of the department.
Because of the involvement of the chief administrative officer in each
state, institutional bias may also be a factor, as it may be in the Maryland system. The bias challenge looms especially prominent with regard to the Illinois procedure since, at one level, the Chief Administrative Officer of the institution and, at another level, the Director of
Corrections, must refer the inmate's complaint to the administrative
tribunal before the inmate ever gets an opportunity to present his
case before a relatively neutral and detached body.
A further problem inherent in existing grievance mechanisms is
the failure to provide the prisoner with representation by counsel.
Only North Carolina and Maryland permit a limited form of representation for the inmate. In cases where a tangle of legal or factual issues
are in question, representation either by counsel or by an appropriate
substitute may be called for, especially if the complaining inmate
does not have the ability to present his grievance effectively. With
such representation, a more thorough record can be prepared for the
purposes of judicial review.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Despite the limited power of state grievance mechanisms to correct the causes which give rise to prisoner complaints, they represent
a meaningful step forward in the redress of prisoner rights by providing inmates with a means to challenge state correctional actions. The
inmate's impulse to contest legitimately the conditions under which
he lives should be encouraged by further official action to improve
grievance procedures, because inmate use of the procedure represents perhaps the best means to relieve the frustrations and tensions
of prison life which often burst into episodes of violence.2 65 The state
285

After relating several violent incidents in the nation's prisons, the Center for

Correctional Justice observed:
The absence of grievance mechanisms did not cause these disturbances,
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will also benefit by learning what defects exist in its correctional system and by having the capacity to respond promptly to legitimate
grievances.
The implementation or modification of inmate grievance procedures should serve two functions. Assuming an exhaustion requirement is imposed on state prisoners by the Supreme Court in McCray
v. Burrell, the mechanism must be perceived by the courts as an
adequate substitute for judicial intervention pursuant to section 1983.
Adequacy should be determined on the basis of the impartiality of the
decision-making body and its authority to grant effective relief. The
additional procedural safeguards that Gagnon v. Scarpelli and Morrissey v. Brewer suggested 266 should attach to any proceeding where
constitutionally protected interests of state prisoners are affected. Additional factors to be considered in determining adequacy should include the promptness of remedial action and whether a sufficient
record has been made for the purposes of judicial review.
The implementation of a grievance mechanism must also serve a
second function: It must be perceived by the prisoner as a viable
alternative to litigation for challenges to conditions of confinement. If
prisoners lack confidence in the effectiveness of the procedure, it is
unlikely that the mechanism will be used and, as a result, no outlet
will be available to effectively relieve the tensions of prison life. Thus
the state will have no means of learning what problems exist in its
institutions. The Center for Correctional Justice, a group of lawyers,
correctional officials, and ex-offenders who have analyzed existing
grievance mechanisms and assisted in the implementation of several
programs, 26 7 has developed several principles which it regards as essential to an effective mechanism. These include participation by
line staff and inmates "in the design and operation" of the grievance
procedure, "relatively short, enforceable time limits," and a continuing program to monitor the procedure and leadership on the part of
corrections administration. 26 8 If these principles are followed in the
implementation of a grievance mechanism, inmate perceptions of the
mechanism should be positive. As a result, there should be no hesitation in resorting to the procedure when a grievance arises.
but that absence, considering the mounting demands for change within each
institution, probably made them inevitable.
C.C.J., supra note 225, at 1-2.
266 See notes 194-207 supra and accompanying text.
267 See C.C.J., supra note 225, at 3-4.
26 SId. at 107-08.
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The consequences of the prevailing no-exhaustion doctrine may
persuade the Court to impose a new requirement. But in changing
the law, it should be made clear that inmate grievance mechanisms
must be designed to safeguard constitutional guarantees carefully so
that prisoners' rights are not sacrificed for the sake of rules fashioned
26 9
to ease the courts' dockets.
Salvatore S. Russo
269 A bill recently introduced in the House of Representatives would impose a new
exhaustion rule in state prisoner actions brought pursuant to section 1983. See H.R.
12008, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4 (1976). The bill states that administrative remedies
which are "plain, speedy, and efficient" must be pursued prior to a grant of relief by a
district court and that remedies which are "ineffective" need not be exhausted. Id. Since
no other guidelines are included to determine adequacy, the federal courts will, by necessity, have to proceed on a case-by-case basis to fashion an appropriate standard, unless
the Court in McCray promulgates uniform procedural rules. The proposed legislation
also authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to intervene in state prisoner
suits when "the case is of general public importance." id. § 3. The Attorney General
may also initiate actions on behalf of state prisoners under circumstances indicating "a
pattern or practice" which results in a deprivation of state prisoners' rights, but only
after he has "notified appropriate officials" and given them "a reasonable time to correct such deprivations." Id. §§ 1, 2.

